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1. INTRODUCTION
Why is the purpose of governmental action sometimes highly relevant to
judicial determination of its constitutional validity and other times completely
irrelevant to that question? Even when purpose is relevant, why is the method of
determining purpose so variable? When should governmental purpose be relevant
to assessment of the constitutional validity of government action? What method
should courts use to determine purpose? This Article seeks to answer these
questions.
Before doing so, it is important to be clear about the meaning of governmental
purpose. A statutory purpose or objective might be different than the motives
of the legislators who enact the statute.' The purpose of executive action might
differ from the motives ofthe executive official for taking the action.2 This suggests
that purpose might be determined objectively by reasoning from the terms of the
statute, declarations of purpose, or the likely public benefit the statute aims to
establish. By contrast, motives might be thought to be a matter of subjective intent.
Because subjective intent is markedly more difficult to determine than objective
intent, perhaps the search for governmental purpose is a search for objective
indicators of governmental intent. Unfortunately, this handy distinction breaks
down in practice. It turns out that purpose is sometimes reckoned by objective
markers such as the terms of the statute3 or the government's stated purposes,4 and
at other times purpose is determined by supposition 5 or inquiry into actual
1. Justice Scalia, for example, has noted that "while it is possible to discern the objective
'purpose' of a statute ([i.e.], the public good at which its provisions appear to be directed), or even the
formal motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth ....discerning the subjective
motivation of those enacting the statute is ... almost always an impossible task." Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. For example, the President might negotiate a treaty that commits the nation to reduce its carbon
emissions. The President declares that the purpose of the treaty is to combat global warming and that
purpose would be a fair inference from the face of the treaty. But the President's motive might be to
curry favor with voters to win reelection: to punish oil companies who have contributed to his opponent;
to spur technological innovation that will reduce the nation's dependence on foreign oil in order to free
the nation from foreign policy entanglements in the Middle East; or any number of other possibilities.
3. Perhaps the most famous statement of this approach is that of then-Justice Rehnquist, with
respect to the application of minimal (or "rational basis") scrutiny: "[T]he plain language of [the statute]
marks the beginning and end of our inquiry [into congressional purpose]." U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U. S. 166, 176 (1980). In an earlier case, Justice Rehnquist declared that the "purpose [of legislation
is] to make the language [of the statute] a part of the ... law." Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 782
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A broader search for purpose "expands the normal meaning of the
word into something more like motive." Id.
4. When applying minimal scrutiny in equal protection cases, Justice Brennan declared that if
"Congress has articulated a legitimate governmental objective, and the challenged classification
rationally furthers that objective, we must sustain the provision." Fritf, 449 U.S. at 188 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
5. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), the Court stated, "When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed."
Id. at 78. More recently, the Court has declared that, under minimal scrutiny, "[w]here ... there are
plausible reasons for Congress' [s] action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, 'constitutionally
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purpose.6 Because the determinants of actual purpose are not tethered to any
objective criteria, the search for actual purpose becomes a probe into the subjective
intentions of government actors a task greatly compounded by the difficulty of
aggregating disparate subjective intentions into a single actual purpose.
A satisfactory answer to the first two questions is more difficult to produce than
a satisfactory answer to the second pair of questions. The Court's focus upon
governmental purpose as a factor to be examined in assessing the constitutional
validity of government action is uncertain and wavering. At the same time, when
the Court deems purpose to be relevant, it employs sharply divergent methods of
locating purpose. Part 11 canvasses some possible explanations for these
phenomena. The Court might be treating governmental purpose as relevant in rough
proportion to the stringency of the level of review it applies. The Court could be
finding purpose to be relevant in cases of individual rights but not with respect to
structural issues, such as federalism and separation of powers. Perhaps the Court
uses governmental purpose as a criterion for decision when examination of the
effects of governmental action is inadequate to decide its constitutional validity. Or,
the Court might simply be relying upon governmental purpose in an ad hoc fashion,
with no concern for identification of a general rationale a process that inevitably
risks incoherence. Given tiered scrutiny, one might suppose that the Court's method
of divining purpose varies with the applicable level of judicial review. Part 11
suggests that none of these answers are satisfactory.
Fortunately, it is easier to answer the normative questions. Because it is the real
world effects of government action that harm or help people, the default criterion
for assessing constitutional validity should be the effects of the challenged
government action. However, consideration of governmental purpose is inevitable
so long as courts continue to use tiered scrutiny as the principal method of
constitutional adjudication. Yet, because it is so extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for a court to infer actual legislative purposes from evidence of the
motives of individual actors, courts should strive to confine purpose inquiry to
objective indicators of governmental purpose. Moreover, reliance upon motive to
infer actual purpose and, thus, to invalidate governmental actions can lead to
anomalous results, such as when the chosen means are ineffective to achieve an
illegitimate actual purpose.7 However, the principle that purpose should be
irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision .... "' Fritf, 449 U.S. at 179
(quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)).
6. Usually, this is phrased as determining the government's actual purpose. See, for example,
Justice Brennan's argument that when applying minimal scrutiny in equal protection cases, if a
"challenged classification is either irrelevant to or counter to [the legislatively stated] purpose, we must
view any post hoc [hypothetical purposes] proffered by Government attorneys with skepticism. A
challenged classification may be sustained only if it is rationally related to achievement of an actual
legitimate governmental purpose." Fritf, 449 U.S. at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The actual purpose
of legislation, then, must be determined by ignoring its stated purpose and possible purposes, and by
attributing a unitary "actual" purpose to a deliberative body an activity that tends to blur any
distinction between purpose and motive because the quest for actual purpose is a search for the
subjective intentions of the legislature or executive official.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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determined from objective intent is not universal. Most importantly, when
constitutionally suspicious effects are produced by a facially valid means that stem
from hidden forbidden motives, a failure to recognize and account for such bad
motives leads to inappropriate outcomes.
There are also a number of exceptions to the general rule that effects should
matter most. When Congress acts to regulate the states in their sovereign capacities,
a clear expression of its purpose to do so ensures the integrity of the political
process upon which federalism limits are heavily dependent and dampens judicial
intervention to preserve federalism boundaries. When illegitimate purpose, by
itself, causes stigmatic or other inherent injury sufficient to constitute a
constitutional violation, purpose and effects are united in an invidious fashion that
requires courts to strike down such measures. When courts are not capable of
assessing whether the means chosen to accomplish an illegitimate purpose are
effective, voiding a measure because it has a clearly identifiable illegitimate
purpose is a prophylactic means to prevent possible constitutional harm. Finally,
purpose is relevant to resolution of the so-called disparate impact cases: When an
apparently legitimate purpose causes suspicious effects, evidence of an illegitimate
actual purpose, even if inferred from motive, separates intended suspicious effects
from the truly unintended, and wholly inadvertent, ones.
These exceptions, however, do not account for all the instances in which the
Court finds purpose to be relevant to a constitutional decision. As a result, there are
several doctrines that are questionable because they use purpose unnecessarily or,
even worse, perversely. In free speech, for example, the Court's use of purpose to
separate content-based and content-neutral speech restrictions generally, and with
respect to the secondary effects doctrine in particular, is ill-conceived and ought to
be scrapped. Judicial focus on purpose to decide whether the government has
created a limited public forum is equally dubious. With respect to the religion
clauses, the Court's insistence on proof ofa secular purpose under the Lemon test, 8
no matter how diluted that inquiry has become, is unnecessary and obfuscatory. To
the extent that the government's clearly identified purpose is either overtly religious
or hostile to religion, such a purpose might fall into the category of inherent or
stigmatic injury and thus be void on that ground alone.9 Absent such a purpose, the
criterion of constitutional invalidity should be the effects of the measure. Similarly,
judicial focus on government hostility to religion in Free Exercise cases is wholly
unnecessary; it is the effect of the government action that bites the religious
observant. Finally, the sui generis undue burden test, applicable to previability
abortion regulations, ought to focus exclusively on whether such abortion
regulations actually erect a substantial obstacle to such an abortion. An ineffective
government purpose to do so poses, by definition, an insubstantial obstacle to
8. Chief Justice Burger first articulated the three pronged test: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion," Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1970) (citing Bd. ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U. S.
236, 243 (1968)): "finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion,"' id at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
9. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1.
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vindication of the constitutional autonomy right in question.
Even when purpose is deemed relevant, the inconsistent judicial method of
ascertaining purpose deserves criticism and reevaluation. The judicial propensity
to sometimes infer an illegitimate purpose from motives when applying minimal
scrutiny is neither necessary nor within the ken ofjudicial cognition. The results of
such cases as U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,"° City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.," Romer v. Evans,"2 and Plyler v. Doe can be
grounded in the irrational effects of the measures at issue and need not rely on
inferred intent. While the use of actual purpose may be more theoretically
justifiable under any level of heightened scrutiny, reliance upon motive evidence
to prove actual purpose enhances the danger that courts will engage in the pseudo-
psychic art of inventing governmental purpose from a skimpy jumble of motive
evidence. Nevertheless, because ofthe skepticism that should attend to examination
of governmental purpose under heightened scrutiny, actual purpose should remain
the focus ofjudicial scrutiny in that context, but clear expression of the method of
determining actual purpose would be helpful to both analysis of constitutional
controversies and prediction of their judicial resolution.
Some of these conclusions may be controversial and, as is always the case in
constitutional law, will provoke disagreement. Of course, that is the academic
function. I hope to spark debate in this undertheorized area,' 4 not to offer the final
word.
Part 11 seeks to briefly describe the inconsistent present use of governmental
purpose, however determined, as an aid to constitutional adjudication, to illustrate
the inconsistent use of motive evidence to reveal governmental purpose, and to
demonstrate the kaleidoscopic methods of locating purpose. Part III consists of an
attempt to derive some overarching principles from what the Court does with
respect to its use of governmental purpose and its method of identifying purpose.
10. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
11. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
12. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
13. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
14. There is a dearth of comprehensive examination of this issue. Perhaps the best treatment is
John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970). A more recent examination is Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis,
85 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1997). A fair amount of attention has been paid to the related, but distinctly
different, problem of developing a principled method of assessing the relative importance of
governmental purposes. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 972-83 (1987) (noting the many critiques of commentators regarding the Court's
adherence to a constitutionaIjurisprudence of balancing); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and
the Powers ofGovernment, 27 GA. L. REv. 343, 348 50 (1993) (arguing thatjudicial decisions rendered
during the New Deal era greatly expanded the Court's view of constitutionally valid governmental
purposes); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term
in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932-37 (1988) (arguing that the Court has failed
to articulate a constitutional basis for its governmental purpose inquiry); Steve Sheppard, The State
Interest in the Good Citi en: Constitutional Balance Between the Citifen and the Perfectionist State,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 983-85 (1994) (noting that the Court begins its analysis by presuming a
legitimate governmental purpose, leaving the adverse party to rebut that presumption).
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That effort is ultimately unsatisfactory. I leave it to the reader to decide whether the
fault is mine or the Court's. Part IV turns to two normative questions: First, when
should governmental purpose be relevant to determination of the constitutional
validity of government actions? Second, when purpose is relevant, what should be
the proper method of ascertaining purpose? In doing so, I hope to reveal why a
number of constitutional doctrines appear to be in error and ought to be
reconsidered or abandoned.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
Every constitutional lawyer knows that constitutional doctrine focuses on the
ends and means of executive and legislative action. While those factors are framed
differently at each level of judicial scrutiny, that framing depends on the
relationship between governmental purposes and the means chosen to accomplish
those ends. Strict scrutiny, of course, requires the government to justify its purpose
as compelling" and to prove that the means chosen are necessary to realize the
compelling purpose. Minimal scrutiny, on the other hand, obliges the challenger to
prove that the government has either no legitimate purpose for its action or that the
action is not rationally related to any conceivable legitimate purpose.
16
A. The Relevance of Purpose
The triggers for strict scrutiny are familiar. In equal protection cases, such
scrutiny is triggered either by the employment of a means that is a presumptive
indicator of a forbidden purpose (e.g., a racial classification) or by a means that has
the effect of infringing a constitutionally fundamental right (e.g., a denial or
dilution of the vote). Governmental purpose is critical in the first instance, but in
the second it is the effects of governmental action that matter. Yet, when the means
employed lack any indication of forbidden purpose (e.g., a racially neutral
classification), even though the effects produced by the chosen means are racially
disparate, courts apply minimal scrutiny absent proof by the challenger that a
government motive for the action was to produce the disparate racial effects. 7
When minimal scrutiny is the level of review, courts find legitimate purpose
15. There is no articulated calculus for determining when a governmental objective, however
determined, is "compelling," much less when a governmental objective is "important." See generally
discussion infra Part II.A.
16. There are, of course, a variety of additional tests, ranging from intermediate scrutiny in equal
protection cases to a host of specially crafted tests for specific areas of constitutional law. Because my
objective here is to draw attention to the role of governmental purpose in constitutional adjudication,
I discuss the permutations of judicial review as they become relevant to my goal.
17. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 68
(1977) (holding that the plaintiffs had failed to sustain their burden of showing that a rezoning
classification was racially motivated); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-46 (1976) (holding that
a neutral law that resulted in a disparate impact upon African Americans did not require invalidation
of the law upon Equal Protection grounds).
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lacking when the effects of the action appear to be explicable only due to an
illegitimate purpose, or when the effects are so wildly underinclusive or otherwise
unrelated to its ostensible purpose that either the rationality of the means or the
legitimacy of the purpose or both are implausible. 8
In substantive due process cases, strict scrutiny results from government
actions that have the effect of infringing a constitutionally fundamental right,
regardless of the government's purpose. With respect to abortion regulations prior
to fetal viability, however, where the unique undue burden standard applies, an
abortion regulation is void if either its purpose or effect is to create a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice of terminating her pregnancy. 9
This phenomenon, however, is not confined to judicial review under the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses. Legislative purpose is central to the increasing
development of clear statement rules in areas in which state autonomy is at issue.
Some such areas include Eleventh Amendment immunity, 0 the scope of the
commerce power, 2 and the conditional spending power. 2  Though these clear
18. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 78 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute prohibiting
sodomy violated the Due Process Clause because it demeaned and stigmatized private adult conduct);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that an amendment of the Colorado constitution
violated the Equal Protection Clause because, notwithstanding the stated purpose of protecting
homosexuals, the amendment operated to prevent local governments from providing homosexuals with
more protection from discrimination); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
448 50 (1985) (refusing to uphold an ordinance that required a special permit for a home for the
mentally retarded when the home did not threaten the city's legitimate interests any more than other
multiperson homes); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 ("[L]egislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct
against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions ofjustice.") U.S. Dep't of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537 38 (1973) (invalidating a provision of the Food Stamp Act, which
included legislative history suggesting that Congress was targeting "hippies," and in operation tended
to exclude from participation "those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even
afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility").
19. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion). The
undue burden standard was adopted by a majority of the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
920-52 (2000) (adopting the undue burden standard in four separate opinions comprising a majority).
20. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (noting that a state
does not waive its immunity in federal court absent a specific, unequivocal indication to do so).
21. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
172-73 (2001 ) (recognizing that when an administrative interpretation of a statute approaches the limits
of Congressional power vis-a-vis the states, the Court expects an express statement that Congress
intended that result); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (noting that in areas of legislation
affecting the "federal balance," the clear statement requirement assures that the legislature has intended
the consequence of its actions).
22. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,207 (1987) ("[]fCongress desires to condition
the States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously.... enabl[ing] the States to exercise
their choice knowingly ...... ") (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)). This could be read as a purpose-driven inquiry, to ensure that Congress does not inadvertently
exact regulatory compliance from the states: but it could also be read as an effects-based inquiry, to
ensure that Congress is sufficiently clear to eliminate the effect of an inadvertent or unknowing
acquiescence by the states. This latter reading is supported by Arlington Central SchoolDistrict Board
of Education v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006), in which the Court stated that it must view conditional
spending measures "from the perspective of a state official who is engaged in the process of deciding
whether the State should accept [federal] funds and the obligations that go with those funds." Id. at
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statement rules are principles of statutory construction, they have been adopted to
avoid constitutional adjudication, and thus have a quasi-constitutional character.
Even after Kelo v. City of New London,2 a taking is for a public use if it "is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."24 The Court could have divined
public use by reference to the effects of the taking, but it instead chose to rely upon
evidence of governmental purpose as the determining factor.
Free speech doctrine depends on a broad divide between content-based speech
regulations, which are generally subject to strict scrutiny,25 and content-neutral
speech regulations, which are generally subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny.26 However, when governments regulate sexually explicit speech, they are
treated to the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral regulations
if their purpose is simply to address the secondary effects of the regulated speech.2
In other cases not involving the secondary effects doctrine, the divide between
content-based and content-neutral regulations is discerned by reference to
governmental purpose. As the Court noted in Ward v. RockAgainst Racism,28 "The
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the government
has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling consideration.
, 21
The government's purpose is also critical to determination of whether or not
it has created a public forum. If the government does not intend to create a public
forum by opening its property to solicitation by charities other than those formed
for legal or political advocacy, it has not created a public forum.3" If the
government intends to provide a passage, but not a public forum, by building a
walkway between a post office and its adjacent parking lot, no public forum is
created." Partly because airports have not been intentionally opened to unbridled
speech, they are not public fora.32
2459.
23. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
24. Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
241 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196-98 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny to a
content-based speech restriction).
26. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (noting that regulations
that are "unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny").
27. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-49 (1986) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to an adult theater restriction); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
71 72 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to an ordinance dispersing adult film theaters).
28. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
29. Id. at 791 (citation omitted).
30. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (citing
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1982)).
31. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990).
32. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1992). Although
a minority ofthe Court would have reasoned from effects rather than purpose to determine the existence
of a public forum in airport terminals, such an approach was rejected. See id. at 693 703 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy outlined the approach in his concurrence:
The Court's error lies in its conclusion that the public forum status of public
property depends on the government's defined purpose for the property, or on an
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Nor is the focus upon purpose limited to the free expression component of the
First Amendment. Evidence of a secular purpose is necessary to a successful
defense of an Establishment Clause challenge under the Lemon test, although proof
of a secular purpose is insufficient to the defense unless the effects of the
government action are religiously neutral. Although strict scrutiny of free exercise
claims is triggered by, among other things, proof that the government regulation is
""specifically directed at... religious practice,"'3 the Court is divided over how that
phenomenon may be shown. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of
Hialeah,34 a four-Justice plurality thought that Hialeah's purpose for banning only
a tiny class of ritual killings of animals was highly relevant to resolution of the
question of whether the ban was neutral with respect to Santeria religious
practices."5 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia noted that
the First Amendment does not refer to the purposes for which
legislators enact laws, but to the effects of the laws
enacted.... Had... Hialeah... set out resolutely to suppress the
practices of Santeria, but ineptly adopted ordinances that failed to
do so, I do not see how those laws could be said to 'prohibi[t] the
free exercise' of religion.... Had the ordinances ... been passed
with no motive ... except the ardent desire to prevent cruelty to
animals .... they would nonetheless be invalid.36
Yet, in Locke v. Davey,3 the Court upheld the State of Washington's denial of
scholarship assistance otherwise available to students majoring in theology,
reasoning that Washington "has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of
instruction"38 and that this refusal was "not evidence of hostility toward religion."39
In dissent, Justice Scalia charged that the "reason the Court thinks this particular
facial discrimination [against religion] less offensive is that [it] was not motivated
by animus toward religion. The Court does not explain why the legislature's motive
matters, and I fail to see why it should."4
explicit decision by the government to dedicate the property to expressive activity.
In my view, the inquiry must be an objective one, based on the actual, physical
characteristics and uses of the property.
Id. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue
and the actual public access and uses that have been permitted by the government indicate that
expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the property is a public
forum." Id. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
33. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
34. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
35. Id. at 540-42.
36. Id. at 558 59 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. 1).
37. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
38. Id. at 721.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. Finding Purpose: All Roads Lead to Rome
Locke and Lukumi also reveal the Court's failure to agree on the method of
locating purpose, even when agreement is reached that purpose is relevant. In
Lukumi, the Kennedy plurality found a governmental purpose of hostility to
Santeria in the "minutes and taped excerpts" of a city council session, which were
replete with condemnations of Santeria.4' This motive evidence was fairly clear
and, to the Kennedy plurality, established Hialeah's purpose in enacting the
ordinances in question.42 In Locke, by contrast, the majority located Washington's
purpose avoidance of using public funds to educate religious ministers in the
history, text, and operation of the Washington constitutional provision that banned
the use of state funds for theological instruction." Despite Justice Scalia's contrary
claim, it was mostly the effects produced by the Washington provision that supplied
the evidence of Washington's purpose.44 None of those effects established a
governmental "animus toward religion,"4 the purpose that must be present to
trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause.
Locke and Lukumi are not isolated exemplars of the Court's division with
respect to the manner in which purpose should be located. When minimal scrutiny
is at issue, the Court varies all over the lot. In United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz,46 for example, the Court fractured over this question. The majority
concluded that purpose was to be reckoned from either the effects produced by the
"plain language" of the statute at issue47 or by any conceivable, albeit conjectural,
purpose. 48 The dissenters argued thatj udges should rely on the stated purpose of the
action unless the effects are irrelevant or contrary to that purpose, in which case the
government's actual purpose should be divined from any source available to a
judge, includingjudicial imputation of motive.49 Justice Stevens's variant approach
was to probe for either actual purpose or a "legitimate purpose that we may
reasonably presume... motivated an impartial legislature."5 To similar effect are
41. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 541.
42. Id. at 540-42.
43. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.
44. Among the effects that the Court found significant in its quest for Washington's purpose were
the following effects: Washington "imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious
service or rite. It does not deny to ministers the right to participate in the political affairs of the
community." Locke, 540 U.S. at 720. "[I]t does not require students to choose between their religious
beliefs and receiving a government benefit[,]" id. at 720-21, because certain students "may still use
their scholarship to pursue a secular degree[,]" id. at 721 n.4, "attend [accredited,] pervasively religious
schools ... , [and] take devotional theology courses[, provided they do not major in theology]," id. at
724 25.
45. Id. at 725.
46. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
47. Id. at 176.
48. See id. at 179.
49. See id. at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 181 (Stevens, J., concurring). For further discussion ofthis panoply of choices regarding
ascertainment of governmental purpose, see infra text accompanying notes 271 73.
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United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno"' and Romer v. Evans.52 As an
alternative rationale for voiding a federal law, the Court in Moreno extracted from
legislative history an illegitimate motive "to harm a politically unpopular group.""
The Court in Romer, however, reasoned from the effects of the Colorado measure
to conclude that "the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects." 4
When heightened scrutiny whether intermediate or strict is applicable, the
Court searches for actual purpose, but its method of locating that purpose is almost
as variable as that displayed under minimal scrutiny. In United States v. Virginia,5
the Court relied on present effects and over a century of history to reject Virginia's
claim that its actual purpose in maintaining the all-male character of the Virginia
Military Institute (VMI) was to foster diversity in educational choices.56 The Court
was unpersuaded by VMI's study of the merits of single-sex military
education which VM1 conducted after sex discrimination became presumptively
unlawful preferring to infer purpose from the effects of continued single-sex
military education. 7 In Wallace v. Jaffree,"8 the Court relied on a combination of
legislative motive (divined from the sponsor's floor comments) and effects to
conclude that Alabama's actual purpose in authorizing a minute's worth of silence
to begin the school day was to return voluntary prayer to the schools.59 In Edwards
v. Aguillard,6 ° the Court reasoned from statutory text and "historic and
contemporaneous antagonisms between.., certain religious denominations and the
teaching of evolution" to attribute a "preeminent [religious] purpose" to Louisiana's
act requiring public schools to teach neither or both of the theories of evolution and
creation science.6' Yet, in Grutter v. Bollinger,62 the Court uncritically accepted
student body diversity as the actual purpose of the University of Michigan Law
School's admissions policy, despite considerable statistical63 and motive64 evidence
51. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
52. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
53. 413 U.S. at 534.
54. 517 U.S. at 632.
55. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
56. Id. at 535-40.
57. Id. at 539-40.
58. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
59. Id. at 56-61.
60. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
61. -d. at 591.
62. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
63. Id. at 383-86 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id at 389-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64. Summarizing the testimony of Michigan's former Dean of Admissions (1979 1990), Justice
Kennedy wrote that "faculty members were 'breathtakingly cynical' in deciding who would qualify as
a member of underrepresented minorities. An example he offered was faculty debate as to whether
Cubans should be counted as Hispanics: One professor objected on the grounds that Cubans were
Republicans." Id. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "Many academics at other law schools who are
,affirmative action's more forthright defenders readily concede that diversity is merely the current
rationale of convenience for a policy that they prefer to justify on other grounds."' Id. at 393 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (quoting Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 34 (2002)).
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in the record that suggested the school's actual purpose was either to produce offers
of admission that mimicked the racial composition of its pool of applicants or to
deliver a subjective notion of redistributive justice.
The Court employs a scattershot approach to determining governmental
purpose; the question is whether there is any unifying principle. Perhaps the Court
is pragmatically eclectic, but this explanation requires definition of the factors that
trigger each mode of purpose determination. A less flattering possibility is that the
judicial determination of purpose, under any level of scrutiny, is entirely an
exercise in expediency. This explanation suffers from its implicit claim that the
Justices are merely politicians in robes committed to a relentless quest for
politically congenial results. These possibilities will be considered at greater length
in Part 111.
C. The Irrelevance of Purpose
Lest one fall into the error of thinking purpose nearly always matters, consider
the areas where purpose never matters. Although John Marshall, in M'Culloch v.
Maryland,5 famously opined that the Court would void laws passed by "Congress,
under the pretext of executing its powers.., for the accomplishment of objects not
entrusted to the [federal] government,"66 the Court has never examined
congressional purpose to locate pretextual uses of its means-enabling power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause.67 Perhaps that inquiry is more properly made
when courts assess the scope ofthe substantive powers given to Congress; however,
since United States v. Darby,6" the Court has eschewed any such scrutiny with
respect to the Commerce Clause power-the "motive and purpose of [commerce
regulations] are matters for the legislative judgment ... and over which the courts
are given no control."69 So long as a law is structured as a regulation of interstate
commerce, it matters not what the underlying purpose of the law may be.7"
Similarly, congressional purpose is irrelevant should Congress either commandeer
65. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
66. Id. at 423.
67. Justice Thomas is the only Justice who seems willing to take Marshall's M'Culloch prextext
qualifier seriously. Dissenting in the medical marijuana case, he declared that "the Government's
rationale-that it may regulate the production or possession of any commodity for which there is an
interstate market . . . would convert the Necessary and Proper Clause into precisely what Chief
Justice Marshall did not envision, a 'pretext... for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
government."' Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 66 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting M'Culloch,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423).
68. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
69. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15 (citing McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 53 59 (1904); Sonzinsky
v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937)).
70. Of course, one could say that so long as Congress regulates interstate commerce itself, or the
channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, its purpose to do so is fully and conclusively
revealed from the face ofthe statute. On this view, purpose matters, but the method of locating purpose
is identical to that stated by then-Justice Rehnquist in UnitedStates Railroad Retirement Boardv. Frit:,
449 U.S. 166 (1980), in which he noted, "[T]he plain language of [the law] marks the beginning and
end of our inquiry [into congressional purpose]." Id. at 176.
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a state's legislative process by compelling it to enact and enforce a federal
command 71 or conscript state executive officers "to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.
In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,7 the Court concluded from its scrutiny of
the effects of the Child Labor Tax Law that Congress's purpose was to impose ultra
vires regulations rather than to tax;74 however, the Court has since abandoned that
effort, perhaps because there can be so many possible purposes for any given
taxation measure. If a tax produces some revenue, courts "are not free to speculate
as to the motives which moved Congress to impose it."'75 If a measure is called a tax
and produces some revenue, it is a valid tax, regardless of Congress's underlying
purpose to use its taxing power to regulate in some fashion that might not otherwise
be open to it.
In taxation, as with commerce, the Court states that purpose is irrelevant and
merges purpose and motive. What the Court has actually done, however, is to
conclusively infer purpose from the face of the statute while barring judicial
examination of either legislative motive or the effects of the law.76 Congress's
purpose in these areas, as revealed by the face of its legislation, is clear: Congress
intends to regulate interstate commerce or impose a tax. Its motive for doing so,
however, may be far afield from the subjects of interstate commerce or taxation. By
declaring motive inquiry off-limits, the Court has also implicitly stated that the
judiciary should ignore the effects of the measure. The most likely motive for
enacting an excise tax on marijuana sales, for example, is to add another layer of
criminality to such trafficking; the principal effect of the measure is not to collect
revenue but to add a possible count to the indictment of apprehended marijuana
dealers. If one were to infer purpose from effects, however, the inferred purpose of
such a measure would be to punish marijuana traffickers.
71. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 63 (1992). In enacting the statute at issue
in New York v. United States, Congress's most likely purpose was to give effect to a deal reached by
the states to ensure that every state had created a safe and reliable means for disposing of low-level
radioactive waste. This legitimate purpose did not save the law, however, because it employed an
impermissible means or, put another way, delivered constitutionally impermissible effects.
72. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (quoting New York v. United States, 505
U.S. at 188) (internal quotation marks omitted). In enacting the measure at issue in Print, Congress's
most likely purpose was to create a mechanism that would prevent handguns from being purchased by
known criminals, lunatics, or others who ought not be trusted with firearms. While legitimate, this
purpose employed an illegitimate means or, phrased differently, produced impermissible effects. (I
assume, of course, the legitimacy of the congressional purpose, even if the personal rights theorists of
the Second Amendment are correct. See Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1125 (2000)).
73. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
74. Id. at 37.
75. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937); see also United States v. Kahriger, 345
U.S. 22, 28 32 (1953) (upholding occupational tax on gamblers), overruled on other grounds by
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54(1968): United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42,44-45 (1950)
(upholding marijuana tax despite its regulatory and penalizing effects).
76. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The law of regulatory takings, by contrast, is almost entirely effects oriented.
Purpose is irrelevant if a regulation effects a permanent dispossession77 or if it
results in the complete loss of all economically viable uses78 (unless the regulation
merely abates what would be a nuisance under the preexisting law of the
jurisdiction).7 9 If the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City8 balancing
test applies, the validity of the regulation turns on assessment of a variety of effects
produced, principally the impact of the regulation on "investment-backed
expectations" and the character of the regulation.8' Neither purpose nor motive are
given any role in the judicial calculus of sifting regulations (which do not require
compensation) from takings (which do require just compensation), but the rejection
of motive inquiry here does not have the by-product of implicit rejection of inquiry
into the effects of the measure. The difference may be attributable to the fact that
taxation and commerce involve federalism limits on federal power, while the law
of regulatory takings is an attempt to preserve the individual liberty of freedom
from compelled transfers of property except where public necessity intervenes.
Ever since the mid-twentieth century the judiciary has been reluctant to police the
federalism frontier,82 while it has assumed ever-increasing responsibility for
protecting individual liberties. 3 Yet, over much of the same period, judicial
solicitude for economic rights has withered.84 Thus, it is not entirely clear that the
Court's disparate approach to the role of purpose, motive, and effects in taxation,
commerce, and regulatory takings can be easily squared.
Perhaps the classic example of a case where purpose, motive, and effects were
each treated differently, and in which motive was regarded as utterly irrelevant, is
77. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
78. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
79. Id. at 1029. Purpose is relevant to the question of whether the regulation is a nuisance
abatement measure, but the Court in Lucas made it clear that the test of whether that purpose has been
validly realized is congruity of the alleged nuisance abatement regulation with the jurisdiction's
preexisting common law of nuisance. Id. Thus, only if the effect of a regulation that strips property of
all economically viable uses is within the boundaries of the prior law of nuisance, will the regulation
be valid and not a taking.
80. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
81. Id. at 124.
82. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971) (upholding federal law
criminalizing local loansharking); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261
(1964) (upholding federal law requiring local hotels and motels to provide accommodations for black
guests).
83. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-14 (1969)
(invalidating the high school's rule precluding students from wearing black arm bands in protest of the
Vietnam War); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 402 (1963) (holding that the state could not deny
unemployment benefits to claimant who, because ofherreligious beliefs, refused employment requiring
her to work on Saturdays).
84. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949)
("[S]tates have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal
commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal
constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law."); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference &
Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 249-51 (1941) (reversing the Nebraska Supreme Court by validating a
statutory provision capping the compensation a private employment agency could collect for services).
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United States v. O'Brien.8 5 Congress amended the Selective Service law to
criminalize the knowing destruction or mutilation of a draft card. 6 In upholding the
validity of the amendment, the Court dismissed fairly persuasive evidence in the
legislative record that Congress had enacted the measure to criminalize a potent
symbolic form of protest against the Vietnam War-draft card burning. The Court
stated, in essence, that so long as a law is otherwise valid, it would not strike that
law down simply because of the presence "of an alleged illicit legislative motive."88
In so doing, the Court conflated purpose and motive, at least when such inquiry is
undertaken to impeach the validity of "a statute that is ... constitutional on its
face."89 Yet, in the balance of the opinion, the Court treated purpose quite
differently. The second and third O'Brien factors an "important or substantial
governmental interest""Yu that is "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression" 9' -require some process by which a court identifies governmental
purpose. The process employed in O'Brien was to identify purpose by reference to
the statute itself.92 Thus, the Court could plausibly state that the purposes served by
the amendment were to preserve a ready means of proving one's draft status, to
facilitate communication between registrant and draft board, and to remind the
registrant of the need to tell his draft board of any change in his status.93 These
purposes were not stated in the statute but were inferred by the Court from the
context of the entire law. Purpose was not quite derived from the "plain language"
of the statute but was certainly drawn from the superficial context of the statute.
The Universal Military Training and Service Act94 was, as its title suggested, all
about establishing a mechanism for conscripting Americans into a brief period of
military service, so the presumed purpose of the amendment was to further that
broader purpose. In effect, the Court employed a metapurpose to find purpose: The
purpose of inquiry into the purpose of specific statutory provisions is to determine
whether there exists a plausible purpose for the specific provision that is consistent
with the larger purpose of the entire statute. Thus, so long as the government could
articulate plausible purposes for the amendment that were consistent with the larger
and more general purposes of the statute, the search for purpose was over. This
method is, of course, a very short step from the reliance on any conceivable
legitimate purpose that is generally, but not universally, applied under minimal
scrutiny.
The final O'Brien factor the requirement that the "incidental restriction" on
free expression be "no greater than is essential" to further the government's
85. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
86. Id. at 370.
87. See id. app. at 386 88.
88. Id. at 383.
89. Id. at 384.
90. Id. at 377.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 383-86.
93. See id.
94. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451 473 (2000).
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purpose 95 -requires an assessment of the effects of the measure. The Court's view
of effects was somewhat myopic, for it regarded as relevant only those effects
produced by conduct alone-the "wilful mutilation or destruction" of draft cards. 9'
Alternatively, it focused on the lack of any other means to accomplish the benign
purpose it had identified,97 an approach that emphasized the incidental nature of any
effect upon free expression. Under either approach, the Court's notion of effects
was selective. The first approach the amendment's effect is only on
conduct-wholly ignored the context ofthe conduct. O'Brien's burning of his draft
card in a public antiwar protest was vastly different from his imaginary burning of
his draft card to kindle a fire to brighten and warm his living room.98 The second
approach reliance on the unavoidable, hence incidental, impact on free
expression-enabled the Court to avoid serious inquiry into the actual impact of the
measure. Though I have no data by which to prove the assertion, I strongly suspect
that the only people ever prosecuted (or even likely to be prosecuted) for "wilful
mutilation or destruction" of draft cards were those who employed that conduct as
a device to demonstrate their distaste for the Vietnam War.
Because the issue in O'Brien arose in the context of a statute that regulated
behavior that could be symbolic expression or utterly lacking in expression, the
problem presented is conceptually analogous to the disparate impact cases, in which
a government uses some constitutionally unsuspicious tool to further a legitimate
purpose and in the end produces effects that are suspicious. The leading case is
Washington v. Davis,99 in which a police department employed a test of verbal and
written proficiency as an employment criterion, which had the effect of
disqualifying four times as many African American applicants as white
applicants. °° Absent proofthat race was a motivating factor for adoption of the test,
the program was entitled to the presumption of validity that applies under minimal
scrutiny.'0 ' Unlike O'Brien, which declared that motive was irrelevant, Washington
recognized that motive ought to be relevant to impeach the validity of apparently
valid governmental action. Rather than being ignored altogether, Washington
treated motive as a useful second-order inquiry, when the effects produced by a
presumptively valid regulation raise at least a constitutional eyebrow.
While this description of purpose, motive, and effect is surely incomplete, it
suffices to convey the kaleidoscopic nature of governmental purpose in the project
of constitutional judicial review. The question presented is whether there is some
order in this chaos. Is there a general principle, or a set of principles, that explains
this apparently random pattern?
95. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-86.
96. Id. at 381.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 378.
99. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
100. Id. at 237.
101. Id. at247 48.
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111. BY DESIGN OR BY AD HOC JUDICIAL EVOLUTION?
Any attempt to tease some general principles out of the Court's use of
governmental purpose is problematic because inductive reasoning is necessary to
that process, and induction is an imperfect art. Unlike deduction-where the
premises compel the conclusion, and the validity of the conclusion depends on the
validity of the premises inductive reasoning relies on the premises to provide
some, but not conclusive, support for the conclusion. Applied to the Court's use of
governmental purpose, one can at best infer some principles that may be at work
but may not be an explanation of the Court's actions. That is the ambition of this
Part 111.
A. Governmental Purpose as a Function of Tiered Scrutiny
A hallmark of constitutional judicial review in the twentieth century was the
development of tiered scrutiny. The creation and refinement of various levels of
review, with their attendant shifts in the presumption of validity of governmental
action and corollary reversals of the burden of proof, was a greatjudicial invention.
The nature of tiered scrutiny, whether strict or lax, is assessment of the
government's objective and the relationship of its chosen means to accomplish that
objective. Thus, consideration of governmental purpose is a necessary element of
tiered review. Because any legitimate objective suffices under minimal scrutiny, but
under strict scrutiny the government must prove that its objective is compelling, one
might surmise that the relevance of governmental purpose increases in rough
proportion to the stringency of the level of review.
Unfortunately, this conjecture is only partially true. While governmental
purpose is critical to heightened scrutiny, the methods used to determine purpose
are, at times, no more searching than those employed under minimal scrutiny.
Consider a few examples.
Strict scrutiny applies only when governments intend to classify by race. While
that element is often established by the face of the classification, it is sometimes
established by proof of discriminatory application of a racially neutral criterion 02
or by the effects of a racially neutral practice that are so precisely and strongly
racial that the only plausible inference is that the government's purpose was to
deliver those racially discriminatory effects.' Purpose invidious intent is
essential to trigger strict scrutiny, but contemporary doctrine treats all intentional
uses of race alike; it does not matter whether the government's purpose is broadly
remedial ofthe lingering social and economic effects produced by centuries ofrace-
based oppression or designed to perpetuate subordination of historically
102. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (striking down an ordinance
regulating laundry facilities that, though "fair on its face and impartial in appearance," was applied "to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances").
103. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960) (invalidating a state
legislative act that redefined a city's boundaries and effectively disenfranchised a majority of black
voters in a municipal district).
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disadvantaged racial minorities. The nuance of governmental purpose matters more
when courts turn to examination of the government's objective. A governmental
purpose to subordinate a racial minority can never be legitimate, much less
compelling, but a governmental purpose to use race as one factor among many to
enhance diversity in public universities is compelling, °4 and courts will defer to the
good faith judgment of university administrators in the application of this
objective. 10 5 In Johnson v. California,0 6 the Court held that strict scrutiny was the
applicable standard to apply to California's policy of segregating prisoners by race
in initial cell assignments. 1' 7 In doing so, the Court rejected the deferential Turner
v. Safley °8 test, which permits prison administrators to abridge the constitutional
rights of inmates when the burdens imposed are "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests."' 0 9 Although the Court did not address the application of strict
scrutiny to California's practice, it opined that the "ban on racial discrimination is
not only consistent with proper prison administration, but also bolsters the
legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system."" 0 The Court conceded that the
"special circumstances" of prisons "may justify racial classifications in some
contexts,"' 1 but remanded the case for consideration of that issue. We do not yet
know whether California's asserted objective to prevent the fatal violence
resulting from racist prison gangs" 2  is compelling or, if so, whether the Court will
defer to the good faith judgment of prison administrators in the application of this
objective. Such deference to governmental judgment is, of course, what one used
to associate with minimal scrutiny.
Assessments of governmental objective whether legitimate, important, or
compelling-are hardly precise, and the Court has been lax in its articulation of the
criteria it employs to reach these characterizations;" 3 but it is at least clear that
under heightened scrutiny, this process requires the Court to identify the
104. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
105. See id. at 329 ("Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse
student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law
School's proper institutional mission, and that 'good faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed'
absent 'a showing to the contrary."') (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
318 19 (1978)).
106. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
107. Id. at 515.
108. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
109. Id. at 89.
110. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510-11.
111. Id. at 515.
112. Id. at 502.
113. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 14 (analyzing the source and role of compelling governmental
interests in Supreme Court jurisprudence). Justice Scalia, in his inimitable style, has derided the entire
process of tiered scrutiny: Minimal, intermediate, and strict scrutiny "are no more scientific than their
names suggest, and a further element of randomness is added by the fact that it is largely up to us which
test will be applied in each case .... [S]trict scrutiny will be applied to the deprivation of whatever sort
of right we consider 'fundamental.' We have no established criterion for 'intermediate scrutiny' either,
but essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea to load the dice." Unites States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 567 68 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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government's actual purpose before it proceeds to characterize that purpose.
However, the quest for actual purpose is not stable. In United States v. Virginia,"4
the Court relied on Virginia's historical sex-segregation practices in higher
education to reject its claimed actual purpose of fostering diverse educational
choices,"' but in Michael M v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,"6 the Court
ignored California's historical practice of treating only male participation in sexual
intercourse involving a female minor as criminal." 7 This asymmetrical law "was
initially enacted on the premise that young women.... [b]ecause their chastity was
considered particularly precious.... were felt to be uniquely in need of the State's
protection. '  The Court, however, brushed that purpose aside to accept
California's present claim that the law's purpose was to inhibit teenage
pregnancies.' The "risk of pregnancy itself' was enough to deter women from
sexual intercourse, reasoned the Court, but a "criminal sanction imposed solely on
males ... serves to roughly 'equalize' the deterrents on the sexes."'2 °
In Stone v. Graham,2 ' the Court inferred a solely religious actual purpose for
displaying the Ten Commandments in public schoolrooms,' 22 but in its more recent
Ten Commandments cases historical context was critical. Three attempts to display
the Ten Commandments in a McCreary County, Kentucky courthouse, where each
successive attempt employed more secular elements than the last, was enough to
convince the Court that the actual purpose was to endorse religion; 2 ' but in the
companion case of Van Orden v. Perry,'24 the Court relied on "the rich American
tradition of religious acknowledgments ' to conclude that Texas's display of the
Ten Commandments on its capitol grounds did not violate the Establishment
Clause, because the display had "a dual significance, partaking of both religion and
government. '  In Epperson v. Arkansas,"' the Court used the history of an
114. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
115. Id. at 536-40.
116. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
117. See id. at 470 74.
118. Id. at 494-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 470.
120. Id. at 473.
121. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
122. Id. at 41.
123. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 869-73 (2005).
124. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
125. Id. at 690.
126. Id. at 692. Because the Court found the Lemon test "not useful in dealing with the sort of
passive monument" at issue in Van Orden, it is rash to assume that the Court concluded that Texas's
actual purpose was not exclusively religious. Id. at 686. Nevertheless, the Court's reliance on a long
history of governmental acknowledgment of religion and characterization of that history as of "dual
significance" suggests that the rationale for the Court's decision was the conclusion that Texas's actual
purpose was secular-acknowledgment, but not endorsement, of religion. Justice Breyer, who supplied
the crucial fifth vote, concurred in the judgment, reasoning that history and context were essential to
the determination of whether Texas's display conveyed a solely religious message or one that combined
the secular and the religious in a constitutionally inoffensive manner. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Justice Breyer found the latter to be the case, relying on the history of the display as communicating
moral rather than religious principles, its physical setting, and the lack of objection for forty years. Id.
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Arkansas law that forbade public school teachers from teaching "the theory or
doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals,"' 28 to
conclude that the state's purpose was to promote "a particular religious doctrine. '
In Edwards v. Aguillard,"30 the Court employed cultural inferences to conclude that
a religious purpose (or motive, or both) prompted the enactment of a facially
evenhanded law requiring the teaching in public schools of both evolution and
creation science or neither.'3 ' If Edwards involved an amalgam of purpose and
motive inquiry, motive was almost entirely what the Court relied on in Larson v.
Valente,'32 in which it voided a facially neutral exemption of some religious
organizations from a general regulation of charitable solicitations.'33
A similar process arises in the application of strict scrutiny to content-based
restrictions of speech. The government's purpose matters mostly to decide whether
the restriction at issue is content-based or content-neutral. Of course, once it is
concluded that the government has regulated speech by its content, the
government's purpose is relevant to the question of whether it is sufficiently
compelling to warrant such regulation. Some categories of speech, defined by
content, are exiled from free speech protection, and the mechanism for doing so is
sometimes, but not always, an assessment of the government's purpose for
regulating such speech. Punishing speech that is intended to incite immediate crime,
under circumstances where it is likely to do so, is permissible'34 because the social
disutility of such speech is strong. This may be a more direct way of saying that the
government's purpose in preventing the immediate commission of a crime is
relevant to the question of whether the entire category of speech should receive
127. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
128. Id. at 98-99 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 80-1627 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 103. The Arkansas statute was enacted in the era which gave rise to the notorious
Scopes trial in Tennessee in 1925, see id. at 109 n. 17, in which John Scopes was convicted of teaching
evolution, see Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363 (Tenn. 1927). A useful summary of the trial is
maintained by Professor Douglas Linder, of the UMKC School of Law. See Douglas 0. Linder, State
v. John Scopes ("The Monkey Trial") (2002), http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials
/scopes/evolut.htm. Scopes's conviction was reversed onnonconstitutional grounds two years later. See
Scopes, 289 S.W. at 367. The Arkansas statute was modeled after the Tennessee law at issue in Scopes
but was not as facially rooted in a religious purpose. Epperson, 393 U. S. at 107-09. The Tennessee law
made it unlawful for public school teachers "to teach any theory that denies the story of the Divine
Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a lower order
of animals." Act of Mar. 13, 1925, ch. 27, 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 50, 50 51.
130. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
131. Id. at 586-94.
132. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
133. Id. at 253 55. The legislative history revealed a change in the bill that extended the
exemption to the Roman Catholic Church but not to other, less popular religious organizations. Id. at
254. From that the Court could, and did, infer a purpose of religious discrimination. Id. at 255. The
legislative history also revealed the underlying motive in the form of a legislator's statement to his
colleagues: "I'm not so sure why we're so hot to regulate the Moonies anyway." -d. at 255 (quoting a
senator whose words were memorialized in the transcript of the legislative discussions) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
134. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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constitutional protection. The level of scrutiny attached to commercial speech
restrictions depends upon whether the government's purpose is "to protect
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, . . . [or to
provide consumers with] beneficial consumer information"' 35 on the one hand, or
to deny consumers access to "truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for
reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process" on the other.'36
However, once the government regulates speech by content within a protected
category, the government's purpose for doing so is no longer of much practical
relevance. 3 7 To be sure, the government can theoretically justify content-based
regulations by proving that they are necessary to accomplish some compelling
objective, but the United States Reports reflect a paucity of successful efforts to do
so. In this area, Gerald Gunther's famous declaration that strict scrutiny is ""'strict'
in theory and fatal in fact"'38 may well continue to apply.
When minimal scrutiny applies, courts usually accept any hypothetical
legitimate objective as sufficient to establish the legitimacy of the government's
purpose. This deferential approach reduces consideration of governmental purpose
to an absolute minimum. So far, that would appear to corroborate the hypothesis
that governmental purpose is more relevant as the level of scrutiny increases. But,
the exceptions to the general application of minimal scrutiny are of more
importance than the general rule. In a small, but steady, stream of important cases,
the Supreme Court has struck down laws or regulations on the basis of an inferred
illegitimate governmental purpose.'39 Unlike the use of purpose in strict scrutiny,
where, with few exceptions, 40 the governmental purpose that is relevant is either
acknowledged or obvious, the government's purpose under minimal scrutiny
analysis is inferred from a variety of evidence, including the effects of the measure,
legislative history, and a certain judicial gestalt that is utterly inconsistent with the
doctrinal postulates of minimal scrutiny.
135. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion).
136. Id.
137. The secondary effects doctrine is a possible exception to this claim. The doctrine is founded
on the fiction that because the government's purpose for regulating nonobscene, sexually explicit
speech is to address the noncommunicative effects of such speech, its nominally content-based
regulation of speech is deemed to be content-neutral. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 311
n. 1 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring). The secondary effects doctrine would surely constitute an exception
to the claim made in the above text were it not for the judicial declaration that governmental purpose
transmutes a particular form of content-based regulation into content-neutral regulation. This exercise
in judicial alchemy is designed to preserve separate levels of review for content-based and content-
neutral regulations without injecting consideration of governmental purpose into the strict scrutiny
analysis applicable to content-based regulations.
138. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
139. See cases cited supra note 18.
140. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 86 (1987) (noting that the Louisianalegislature
stated no clear purpose for the Louisiana Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-
Science in the Public School Instruction Act, which required creation science to be taught if evolution
was also taught or required the exclusion of both theories if one of the theories was not taught).
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Moreover, judicial reliance upon governmental purpose seems even more
chaotic under intermediate scrutiny. In sex discrimination cases, the Court seeks to
use intermediate scrutiny to void those measures that are rooted in archaic sex role
stereotypes, and uphold those that either compensate women for the effects of
historic disadvantage or are intended to recognize real, rather than stereotypical,
differences between the sexes. Consideration of governmental purpose is critical
to this effort. 4' Yet when a somewhat different brand of intermediate scrutiny is at
work with respect to free expression, governmental purpose is of little relevance.
A content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation is valid if it does not "burden
substantially more speech than is necessary"'4 2 to serve a legitimate interest and
"leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication."'4 So long as the
government can articulate some purpose for its time, place, and manner regulation
of speech that is unrelated to its content, purpose inquiry is at an end. Much the
same condition attaches to the four-part O'Brien test that arose in the context of
regulations that pinch symbolic expression.'44 As discussed earlier, in O'Brien, the
Court dismissed fairly persuasive evidence that Congress had acted to punish draft
card burning to suppress a potent form of Vietnam War protest'45 and declared that
it "will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged
illicit legislative motive."'4 6 Because the law was facially valid if one accepted the
government's hypothesized purpose for the amendment, the Court was unwilling
to take its purpose inquiry any further.'47
The emerging pattern is that, while consideration of governmental purpose is
required by the framework of tiered scrutiny, the Court's use of governmental
purpose is spread unevenly across all levels of tiered scrutiny. Although actual
purpose must be determined when heightened scrutiny is employed, the methods
of locating that purpose vary widely. Even when actual purpose is determined, and
that purpose is subjected to a uniform standard ofj ustification, the Court's practical
scrutiny of purpose varies considerably. Nowhere is this pattern more chaotic than
at the level of minimal scrutiny, where the Court cannot even agree on how purpose
is ascertained. One might expect that as the level of scrutiny increases courts would
141. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536 40 (1996) (rejecting Virginia's stated
purpose of providing diversity in its public higher education system through reliance on history and
effects to conclude that Virginia's policy was rooted in outdated generalizations about the capacity and
skills of women), with Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 470 74 (1981)
(accepting California's deterrence purpose for punishing men, but not women, for sexual intercourse
with a female minor, regardless of evidence of a contrary history and disputed present effects).
142. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
143. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
144. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) ("[A] government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.").
145. Supra note 87 and accompanying text.
146. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383.
147. Id. at 384.
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be more likely to draw inferences to detect purposes, yet judicial willingness to
draw inferences in order to consider governmental purpose seems at least as likely
when intermediate or minimal scrutiny applies.
B. Governmental Purpose as a Function of Individual Rights but Not
Constitutional Structure
One theme of constitutional adjudication over the course of the twentieth
century is the increasing vigor of judicial review to enforce individual liberties'48
and the concomitant decline in the use ofjudicial review to enforce constitutional
limits on the scope of congressional powers.'49 While it is true that the so-called
"new federalism"'"5 that began in the 1990s appeared to indicate revived judicial
scrutiny of federalism limits, that movement has sputtered like a badly tuned
engine.' Although the Court has evinced a continued willingness to enforce
implicit, federalism-based limits on state power primarily through the Dormant
Commerce Clause-and to adjudicate issues of allocation of power between the
three branches of the federal government, an undeniable aspect of the last century
is the vast explosion of judicial enforcement of the Constitution's guarantees of
individual rights and liberties. One might suppose that, whether it be cause or
effect, courts would think governmental purpose less relevant to the judiciary's role
in policing federalism limits on federal power and more relevant to questions of the
scope of constitutional individual liberties.
148. See cases cited supra note 83.
149. See cases cited supra note 82.
150. Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? The Roberts Court and the Future of Election Law, 57 S.C. L.
REV. 669, 681 82 (2006) (describing the term "New Federalism" as the Rehnquist Court's attempt to
rein in "congressional power vis-a-vis the states").
151. The Court's reaffirmation of Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 29 (1942) (holding that
Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate individual home consumption of
homegrown wheat because of its effects on the national supply and demand of wheat) in Gon ales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-20 (2005) (upholding Congress's regulation of intrastate growth and use of
marijuana as a proper exercise of the Commerce Clause power because Congress had a rational basis
for believing the intrastate activity would undercut the interstate regulation ofmarijuana by leaking into
illicit channels) is perhaps the most vivid reminder that the revival ofjudicially enforceable federalism
has distinct limits. Other recent indications of that phenomenon are Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
530 34 (2004) (upholding congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting the provisions of title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, which require states to provide disabled people with access to courthouses and
other similar public facilities), and Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
735 37 (2003) (upholding congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993), as well as
the absence of any indication that the Court is inclined to develop a state autonomy limit on the
spending power that would mimic the commerce limits imposed by Print: v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 933 35 (1997) (holding that the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violated the Tenth
Amendment by commanding state chief law enforcement officers to perform background checks on gun
purchasers) and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 violated the Tenth Amendment because it directed
states to dispose of radioactive waste).
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This hypothesis is partly, but not universally, true. An important aspect of the
New Deal revolution in constitutional adjudication was the Court's rejection of
consideration of governmental purpose as a criterion for ascertaining whether a
given federal law was within the scope of one of Congress's enumerated powers.
United States v. Darby12 is the clearest articulation of this view. Darby disavowed
Hammer v. Dagenhart153 and its use of inferred purpose as a means of deciding
whether Congress had properly invoked its interstate commerce power. 54 A similar
unwillingness to consider purpose can be observed with respect to other federal
powers, particularly Congress's power to tax and regulate conditions ancillary to
warfare. 155 Even the Court's contemporary limits on Congress's power to enforce
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, a staple of the "new federalism," are
largely bereft of consideration of governmental purpose. Instead, the focus is upon
what Congress has done and whether Congress has acted in a congruent and
proportional fashion to address identified state behavior that offends the
constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 56 Congressional purpose
for so acting is of little relevance to this calculus." 7
Nor is governmental purpose of much significance in assessing the propriety
of various executive or legislative initiatives that are alleged to offend the
Constitution's structural principles of separated power; rather, what Congress or the
President has done is important for resolution of these conflicts. The purpose
behind these actions is relevant only insofar as it serves to flesh out the context in
which the action takes place but is not an actual criterion of decision. Thus, in
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 58 the Court considered the context of the President's
suspension of pending suits against Iran rather than directly considering the
President's purpose, which, of course, was to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis.1
9
Similarly, in the Steel Seizure Case,'60 the Court considered the President's seizure
of the steel mills in the context of the Korean War and to that extent recognized his
purpose was ostensibly to avoid interruption of the production of needed war
materials.' In neither case did the Court probe deeply into purpose, whether
152. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
153. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
154. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115 17.
155. See discussion supra Part lI.C.
156. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (noting that the proper
analysis when determining the validity of remedial measures enacted by Congress pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is whether the law reflects a proportionality or congruence
between the means adopted and the ends to be achieved).
157. The exception is Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003),
in which the Court relied on the stated purpose of the Family and Medical Leave Act-"to protect the
right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace" id. at 728, as a basis for
characterizing the statutory provision at issue-a requirement that employers grant up to twelve weeks
of unpaid leave to care for ill family members-id. at 724, as a response to presumptively invalid sex
discrimination in granting such leaves, id. at 728 35.
158. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
159. Id. at 664-67.
160. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
161. Id. at 582 84.
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derived from the action itself or by reliance upon inferred motive. President
Carter's motive may have been to prevent incoming President Reagan from
receiving all of the credit for the resolution of the crisis; President Reagan's motive
may have been to remove a thorny issue immediately upon entering office; and
President Truman's motive may have been to accede to the wage demands of the
steelworker's union in an election year. One will never know for sure, and the Court
did not think such inquiry was relevant. Even as far back as The Prize Cases62 the
Court focused on the effect of President Lincoln's action of imposing a blockade
on Confederate ports and not on his purpose or motive for taking such action.'63
However, purpose remains far more relevant in other areas that are rooted in
constitutional structure. Foremost among these is the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Regulations that are openly intended to protect local commerce from interstate
competition are void per se.' 64 State regulations that may lack that intention, but
which facially discriminate against interstate commerce, are subject to strict
scrutiny. 65 State regulations that are facially neutral with respect to interstate
commerce are nominally subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. balancing test. 66
Despite this taxonomy, the actual pattern that emerges from the Dormant
Commerce Clause cases is that the Court scrutinizes both the effects of and the
governmental purpose for such regulations in order to decide whether such
regulations are valid. A modern example is West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
16
1
in which the Court voided a facially neutral tax and subsidy scheme because its
purpose and effect was to benefit Massachusetts dairy farmers at the expense of
out-of-state milk producers and Massachusetts consumers.161 Classic examples of
this mode of reasoning include Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. 169 and H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond.7 ' In Baldwin the Court ascribed a protectionist purpose to
New York's facially neutral regulations concerning the sale of milk, given its effect
on Vermont milk producers. 7 ' In Hood, the Court voided New York's refusal to
162. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
163. See id. (analyzing the effects of President Lincoln's decision to impose a blockade on
southern ports in the context of the presidential authority to do so during an insurrection between the
states, as opposed to Congressionally declared war).
164. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 73 (1984) (holding that a
Hawaiian liquor tax that excluded indigenous liquor violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because
it had the purpose and effect of discriminating against out-of-state liquor).
165. See, e.g., City ofPhila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 24 (1978) (declaring that state laws
that discriminate against interstate commerce or are protectionist in nature are "virtually per se"
invalid).
166. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.") (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S.
440, 443 (1960)).
167. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
168. Id. at 194 96.
169. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
170. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
171. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522 26.
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license a processing plant owned by a Massachusetts entity.' 72 Although New York
maintained that its action was for the purpose of preventing "destructive
competition ' in the local milk market, the Court perceived this purpose to be
naked protectionism.' 4 To be sure, not all Dormant Commerce Clause cases
involve assessment of governmental purpose, and sometimes the Court disavows
any attempt to do so,175 but just as frequently the Court considers evidence of
discriminatory purpose as but one factor in its Pike balancing calculus.' 76
When Presidents claim executive privilege, their purpose for doing so becomes
an issue. United States v. Nixon,'77 the leading case on the subject, makes plain that
while the President's claim of executive privilege is entitled to a presumption of
validity, a court must weigh the purposes for which the President asserts the
privilege against the reasons for compelled disclosure of the material the President
seeks to keep confidential.' 78 In Nixon, the President's purpose was kindly
characterized as "general in nature" while disclosure was essential to secure due
process and a fair trial for accused criminal defendants.' Undergirding the
euphemism was what many then suspected and now know to be the case: The
President's motive for asserting executive privilege was to avoid the heavy weight
of personal responsibility for his misconduct in office, even if his purpose was to
protect executive confidentiality. The Court was no less naive than the rest of the
nation; only a bit more polite.
If judicial consideration of purpose with respect to federalism and separation
of powers presents a mixed bag, so too does judicial consideration of purpose with
respect to individual liberties. Purpose is irrelevant when the problem is deciding
which unwritten rights are sufficiently rooted in our history and tradition to be
characterized as constitutionally fundamental. While justification of infringement
of fundamental rights requires proof of a compelling interest, the Court has not
questioned whether the government's asserted purpose is its actual purpose. Instead,
it has confined its attention to evaluation of the interest. 80
172. Hood, 336 U.S. at 545.
173. Id. at 529 (quoting the Commissioner's report which denied Hood's application for expanded
facilities).
174. See id. at 539 40.
175. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1977) (pointing out
that the stated purpose of the law at issue was so completely undermined by its operation that the Court
was not compelled to seriously incorporate it into the calculus of its decision).
176. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 677 79 (1981) (noting the Iowa
statute that restricted the length ofvehicles using its highways was actually an attempt to deflect through
traffic and limit the use of its highways).
177. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
178. Id. at 708 13.
179. Id. at 713.
180. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 79 (1990)) (noting the Court's standing assumption of a
fundamental right to be free from unwanted medical treatment); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-84 (1976) (discussing various provisions of Missouri law regulating
abortions, with a focus on the constitutional underpinnings that warranted the recognition of abortion
as a fundamental right); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147 52 (1973) (discussing the state's interests in
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As discussed earlier, governmental purpose is mostly irrelevant to the
determination of many issues of free expression, but not all. 8' Purpose is of little
consequence to such procedural doctrines as overbreadth or vagueness, and plays
only the most attenuated role in deciding questions regarding the extent of
governmental control over the speech of its employees, public school students,
prisoners, or military members. Those issues are decided in large part by balancing
the ability of the government to discharge its function against the public's right to
learn of matters of public interest. Government function is not the same as
government purpose. Yet, government purpose is critical to the resolution of limited
public forum cases and plays some role in deciding the extent of government
control of speech that it sponsors. In Rust v. Sullivan,'82 for example, the
government's purpose-encouraging childbirth rather than abortion-was deemed
to be relevant to the question of whether the government could selectively fund a
program to advance its purpose.'83 In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,'84 the
government's purpose was also relevant, but this time the purpose providing
financial support for legal services for people too poor to afford a lawyer-was
thought to prevent the government from muzzling the lawyers for the poor.'85
Similarly, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia'86 struck
down a ban on the introduction of religion in university-funded student publications
because the university's purpose in providing the funds was not to convey a
university message, but "to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers,"' 87 and that purpose was inconsistent with its denial of funding for
religious speech.
Examination of governmental purposes can produce knotty conflicts in this
area. An example is the controversy over the application of public university
policies forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to university-
funded student groups.'88 A typical such policy would deny official recognition,
funding, and use of university facilities to a student religious group that sincerely
believes that homosexual conduct is sinful and thus bars openly gay and lesbian
students from voting membership in the group. The university's, and therefore the
government's, purpose in enacting the policy is to prohibit what it regards as
invidious discrimination against its students. The government's purpose in
recognizing and funding student groups, as well as providing access to university
facilities, is to create a limited public forum one limited to student groups that do
not practice invidious discrimination. The government is free to use viewpoint-
outlawing abortion and eventually concluding that abortion is a fundamental right which outweighed
the state's interest in preventing the procedure).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 134 38.
182. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
183. Id. at 192-93.
184. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
185. Id. at 548 49.
186. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
187. Id. at 834.
188. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-4484 JSW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347,
at *4 14, (N.D. Cal. April 17, 2006) (detailing the facts of one such case).
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neutral, reasonable distinctions to limit access to its nontraditional fora, and a
nondiscrimination policy is viewpoint neutral. 8 9 Nor does the policy require that
the hypothetical religious student group accept gays and lesbians as members, but
it does require that the group do so as a condition of access to the limited public
forum.' 90 Similarly, the policy in Rosenberger did not preclude publication of the
student religious magazine but did require that it abandon its religious message as
the price of access to the limited public forum created by the University of
Virginia. 9 ' Thus, it may be that a governmental purpose to compel unwanted
association, as the price of admission to the forum, produces the same outcome as
Rosenberger. The outcome is different, however, if the government's purpose is
characterized as a mere refusal to subsidize conduct that the university regards as
offensive and harmful. From that perspective, the issue resembles Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington,192 in which the Court upheld federal
laws that permit tax deductibility of contributions to charitable organizations that
do not engage in political lobbying.'93 Much depends on identification of
governmental purpose-a fact that highlights the importance of principled inquiry
into purposes.
Equal protection cases, as previously discussed, manifest curious uses of
purpose as a rigid device to trigger strict scrutiny and as a flexible tool to resolve
its application.' 94 Moreover, there is no clear linkage between the importance of
purpose and the level of scrutiny employed. Sometimes purpose matters more in
intermediate scrutiny than in strict scrutiny, and sometimes matters a great deal
under minimal scrutiny. Finally, there is no common method of ascertaining
purpose; indeed, courts appear to be more willing to infer a purpose when applying
minimal scrutiny than when considering whether strict scrutiny should apply.
Purpose does matter in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence at
least when the Lemon test is applied but not as much when the endorsement or
coercion tests are at issue. The endorsement test focuses on what message, if any,
a reasonable and informed observer would receive from governmental exhibitions
of religious symbols, texts, or rituals.' 95 If purpose is relevant to that inquiry, it is
only the purpose divined by the reasonable observer. To that extent, the method of
finding purpose under the endorsement test is to assess the effects of the
government's action. The coercion test focuses almost exclusively on the effects of
189. See, e.g., id. at *41 ("[T]he fact that the neutral policy [of the public university] may affect
a group with a certain perspective or belief system does not render the policy viewpoint based.").
190. See id. at *51 ("[The public university] is not directly ordering CLS to admit certain students.
Rather, [the university] has merely placed conditions on using aspects of its campus as a forum and
providing subsidies to organizations.").
191. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827.
192. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
193. See generally id. (holding that a statutory scheme that grants tax exempt status to certain
organizations that do not engage in substantial lobbying activities does not violate the First
Amendment).
194. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
195. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37-38 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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the government's action. 196 No matter how benign the government's purpose may
be, if the effect of its action is to force unbelievers to profess belief by word or
deed, or to force believers to deny their beliefs, the government's action is invalid.
Finally, as revealed by Lukumi and Locke, 9 7 the Court is divided as to the relevance
of purpose in assessing claimed violations of the free exercise guarantee.
This sampler of individual rights jurisprudence suggests that, while purpose
may matter a bit more in the area of individual rights than with respect to issues of
allocation of government power, purpose is not universally or consistently
employed in resolving claims of infringement of individual rights. Purpose pops up
here and there, and while it may show up more often in individual rights cases, it
is not there with enough reliability to conclude that courts consistently use purpose
to decide individual rights cases, much less that purpose lies exclusively in the
domain of individual rights.
C. Governmental Purpose as a Decisional Criterion when Effects Cannot Be
Accurately Determined
Another possible explanation for the Supreme Court's actual practice is that it
considers governmental purpose as a criterion for decision when examination of the
effects of governmental action is inadequate to decide the law's constitutional
validity. Unfortunately, this explains only a portion of the Court's practice, and thus
cannot be a general guide to the Court's consideration of governmental purpose.
Dormant Commerce Clause cases are a prime example of diffuse and difficult-
to-assess effects. Yet even in these cases, the Court does not consistently consider
purpose only when the effects of the state regulation are inadequate grounds for
decision. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey98 is a helpful example. New Jersey
barred out-of-state solid waste from its landfills and defended the action as a
legitimate measure that would preserve New Jersey's scarce and diminishing
landfill capacity. 199 The Court accepted that objective as legitimate but ruled that
because the barrier was discriminatory on its face, it could only be justified by
proof that the discrimination was necessary to achieve New Jersey's objective.2"'
Because there were other, less discriminatory means of preserving New Jersey's
landfill space, the regulation was voided.20 ' The Court did not discuss the effects
of the ban, evidently thinking it was sufficient to note its overtly discriminatory
nature. Perhaps the Court's reliance on facial discrimination as the trigger to strict
scrutiny rested on an unarticulated judgment that effects would prove too difficult
to measure. Those harmed by the New Jersey ban were out-of-state waste
producers who presumably would be forced to use higher cost landfills and New
Jersey landfill operators who would experience lower demand and, possibly,
196. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 33 40.
198. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
199. Id. at 618-19, 625.
200. Id. at 626-29.
201. Id. at 629.
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diminished revenue. Conversely, beneficiaries of the ban were New Jersey waste
producers and out-of-state landfill operators. Moreover, this taxonomy completely
fails to assess the relative magnitude of these gains and losses. Without more
detailed data, it was impossible to determine whether the net effects of the New
Jersey measure actually harmed interstate commerce. Thus, because the effects
were so difficult to measure with any tolerable degree of accuracy, this would
appear to be a prime candidate for close scrutiny of governmental purpose. The
Court avoided doing so by relying on the facial discrimination of the New Jersey
law, even as it accepted the legitimacy ofNew Jersey's claimed purpose. Of course,
the face of the regulation revealed a purpose discrimination against out-of-state
waste producers and so it could be argued that the Court did rely upon purpose.
If it did, its mode of determining purpose was quite Rehnquistian: the plain words
of the statute were the alpha and omega of purpose.
Another example is West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,2"2 in which the Court
voided a Massachusetts regulation that imposed a tax on milk sold by dealers to
Massachusetts retailers, the proceeds of which were used to subsidize
Massachusetts dairy farmers.2 3 Approximately two-thirds ofthe milk subject to the
tax came from out-of-state.2 4 The Court stated that the regulation's "avowed
purpose and its undisputed effect are to enable higher cost Massachusetts dairy
farmers to compete with lower cost dairy farmers in other States., 20 5 Despite this
identified protectionist purpose, the Court proceeded to examine and rely on the
effects of the measure, including analysis of interest group politics within
Massachusetts.2 6 On that latter score, the Court was influenced by the fact that the
subsidy defused in-state dairy farmers as an important opponent of the tax, leaving
only unorganized consumers and milk dealers as likely opponents.2 °7 Though the
Court did not say so, milk dealers were probably indifferent because they could
pass on the incidence of the tax to consumers. If purpose were relevant only when
effects are difficult to assess, there should have been no occasion to consider
purpose in West Lynn Creamery because the effects of the scheme were so clearly
protectionist and the interest group proxy for out-of-state interests was eliminated.
However, purpose was expressly considered and, when combined with effects,
doomed the measure.
Yet another illustration is Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,20 8 in which the
Court struck down Madison, Wisconsin's prohibition of the sale of all milk not
pasteurized within five miles of Madison's central square.20 9 The Court accepted as
legitimate Madison's claimed purpose of ensuring sanitary milk and spent the
remainder of its opinion assessing the prohibition's effects on interstate
202. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
203. Id. at 188.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 194.
206. Id. at200 01.
207. Id.
208. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
209. Id. at 356.
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commerce.2 10 Though the rule was facially neutral, the Court saw its effect as a
complete exclusion of out-of-state milk.2 ' Not so, charged the dissent, for out-of-
state bottlers could locate a plant within five miles of Madison if they chose to do
so. 21 A sharper assessment of the effects of the Madison ordinance would require
some analysis of the economic feasibility of compliance with the ordinance by out-
of-state bottlers. This is beyond the ken of the judiciary, and so one might expect
a more jaundiced examination of Madison's purpose if the Court turns to purpose
when effects are inadequate. This did not happen in Dean Milk, perhaps because the
Court was convinced its analysis of effects was adequate.
Two other Dormant Commerce Clause cases provide final illustrations of the
improbability of this theory of the Court's consideration of governmental purpose.
Ostensibly as a consumer protection measure, North Carolina barred apple shipping
containers from bearing any grade other than the U.S. Department of Agriculture's
grade.213 Though this regulation was facially neutral concerning interstate
commerce, the Court struck it down in Hunt.214 Almost all of the Court's analysis
was devoted to the effects of the rule.21 ' Because Washington State had developed
its own grading system, apparently superior to the USDA's system, the North
Carolina regulation stripped Washington apple growers of a competitive
advantage. 21 6 The Court intimated that the North Carolina law might have been
intended to discriminate against interstate commerce but stated that consideration
of purpose was unnecessary to resolution of the case.217 Yet, a year later, in Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,2"' the Court upheld a Maryland statute that
prohibited gasoline refiners from owning retail gasoline stations in Maryland.21 9
The effect of the ban, reasoned the Court, did not discriminate against interstate
commerce. 20 Maryland had not inhibited the interstate flow of gasoline, nor had it
barred out-of-state, independent retailers from doing business in Maryland.22" ' The
Commerce Clause "protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms. 222
Again, a full appreciation of the effects of the ban would require assessment of the
economic strength of independent, interstate retailers, as well as the impact of the
ban on the amount of gasoline moving through interstate commerce into Maryland.
These factors are not easily determined by judges, suggesting that the Court should
have looked at Maryland's purpose if the Court was dedicated to the principle that
it consider purpose when effects are insufficiently clear. The only reason the Exxon
210. Id. at 353-57.
211. Id. at 354.
212. Id. at 357 (Black, J., dissenting).
213. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 335 (1977).
214. Id. at 352 53.
215. See id. at 350 52.
216. Id. at 351.
217. Id. at 352-53.
218. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
219. Id. at 119 21.
220. Id. at 125.
221. Id. at 126.
222. Id. at 127.
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Court thought the effects of Maryland's ban were clear and constitutionally
insignificant was because the ban distinguished between interstate markets and
interstate competitors. 2 ' But Hunt did not make that distinction; nor did the Court
in Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers ofAmerica v. Walsh,224 in which the
Court upheld Maine's "Maine Rx" program.225 Maine offered prescription drug
manufacturers a choice of reducing prices by granting rebates to pharmacists, which
were required to be passed on to consumers, or subjecting their Medicaid drug sales
to an undesirable "prior authorization" program. 2 6 The Court relied heavily on the
fact that Maine's program, unlike the scheme at issue in West Lynn Creamery, did
not impose "a disparate burden on any competitors. '2 7 Here, the effects may have
been benign with respect to interstate competitors, but there was little discussion
of the impact on interstate market, and none with respect to Maine's purpose.
The Dormant Commerce Clause cases, which one would expect to be the most
fertile ground for evidence of the Court's consideration of purpose as a fallback
device when assessment of effects is inadequate for decision, thus fails to bear out
this hypothesis. Perhaps thisjudgment is too harsh, for the Court may simply be too
quick to think that its assessment of effects is adequate. However, further evidence
that this theory is not borne out by the Court's practice may be seen by a brief
examination of other areas of constitutional adjudication.
For brevity's sake, consider only the Court's use of purpose and effects in
connection with the religion clauses. When government action is challenged as a
forbidden establishment of religion, and the Court applies the Lemon test, the
government is required to articulate a secular purpose for its action. This is not very
difficult, as almost any plausible secular purpose will suffice, and then judicial
attention is focused on whether the effects of the action primarily benefit or harm
religion, or, if not neutral towards religion, at least deliver only incidental benefits
or harms to religion. Given that most of the action under the Lemon test occurs
when the Court is assessing effects, one is tempted to say that the test tends to
confirm the hypothesis that the Court considers purpose as a second order inquiry.
This hypothesis, however, is belied not only by the fact that proof of secular
purpose is a nominal predicate to consideration of effects but also by the Court's
occasional severe scrutiny of purpose.
In Edwards v. Aguillard,228 the Court voided Louisiana's law requiring public
schools to choose between teaching no origin theory at all or teaching both the
theory of evolution and creation science. 2 9 Louisiana asserted a secular purpose for
the law-academic impartiality with respect to the origin of life-but the Court
treated this purpose as insincere and a sham.23 It reasoned to that end by examining
223. Id. at 127 28.
224. 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
225. Id. at 670.
226. Id. at 649 50.
227. Id. at 670.
228. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
229. Id. at 581-82.
230. Id. at 586 87.
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provisions of the law that required schools to develop curriculum guides for
creation science but not for evolution, and provisions that protected creation
scientists and teachers of creation science from retribution."' From this the Court
concluded that Louisiana had a "preeminent religious purpose" 232 and voided the
law on its face, without waiting to see what the actual effects of the law might be
in practice.233 Perhaps, as Justice Scalia observed in dissent, creation science in
practice would amount to "no more than a presentation of the Book of Genesis,
' 234
but it would be these actual, real world effects that would doom the law, not the
dismissal ofLouisiana's stated secular purpose as a sham in favor of a suppositional
purpose.
235
Edwards is not alone. Voluntary readings from the Bible were disallowed in
School District ofAbington v. Schempp 2 6 on the ground that the only purpose of
the readings was to further religion, despite the government's contention that the
readings were intended to promote moral values, contradict materialism, perpetuate
cultural institutions, and teach literature. 231 Was the Court unable to assess the
effect of Bible readings? In Epperson v. Arkansas, 238 the Court voided Arkansas's
law prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution.239 After examining the
history of the law's adoption and the lack of any asserted secular purpose for the
law, the Court reasoned that
there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its
teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is
contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be
the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man. No
suggestion has been made that Arkansas'[s] law may be justified
by considerations of state policy other than the religious views of
some of its citizens.240
Would not the effect of the law have been to privilege one religious view of the
origins of life? Wallace v. Jaffree241 voided an Alabama law that authorized public
schools to set aside one minute for "meditation or voluntary prayer ' 242 on theground that Alabama's religious purpose to inject voluntary prayer into the schools
231. Id. at 588.
232. Id. at 590.
233. Id. at 594 97.
234. Id. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. But see discussion infra Part IV. D for a discussion of why purpose inquiry should be relevant
with respect to facial challenges.
236. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
237. Id. at 223.
238. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 107.
241. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
242. Id. at 40 (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984), repealed by Act of Apr. 27, 1998,
Act No. 98-381, § 2, 1998 Ala. Laws 715, 716) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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could be inferred from the fact that the law was a "sequel" to a prior law that
authorized a one minute period of silence for "meditation. '243 Here, by contrast, the
effect of the law was indeterminate.
Stone v. Graham244 found that Kentucky's requirement of posting a copy of the
Ten Commandments in every public school classroom lacked any secular purpose,
despite the state's claim that the Ten Commandments form the basis for many
secular laws.24 Because the "Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in
the Jewish and Christian faiths," '246 the Court reasoned that the actual purpose of the
Kentucky statute was entirely religious-based on the Court's perception of the
statute's effects. 247 In McCreary County v. ACL UofKentucky, 4 1 the Court inferred
from government actions a wholly religious purpose for the posting of the Ten
Commandments in a Kentucky courthouse.249 The Court did not consider effects;
rather, purpose must "be taken seriously.., and needs to be understood in light of
context.,, 250 Context mattered, but the Lemon test did not, in Van Orden v. Perry,
25 1
in which the Court upheld Texas's display of a granite monument inscribed with
the Ten Commandments.252 Neither Texas's purpose for the display nor its effects
were given much consideration because the Court opined that the Lemon test was
"not useful" for resolution of the case. 253 Rather, the Court relied on a long
historical tradition of public recognition of the Ten Commandments and other
manifestations of religious belief to conclude that "the rich American tradition of
religious acknowledgments, 254 embodied by Texas's passive display, did not
constitute a forbidden establishment of religion.2 5 This tale of the Court's
consideration of governmental purpose in dealing with alleged religious
establishments fails to support the notion that the Court turns to purpose only when
its consideration of effects is inadequate for decision.
The Court's modern application of the Free Exercise Clause produces a more
mixed picture. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith2 1 confined the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert v. Verner2 1 into a very small
243. Id. at 58 60 (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984)) (internal quotationmarks omitted).
244. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
245. Id. at 41.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 42 ("Posting of [the Ten Commandments] serves no [secular] educational function. If
the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the
schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments.").
248. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
249. Id. at 869-73.
250. Id. at 874.
251. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
252. Id. at 690 92.
253. Id. at 686.
254. Id. at 690.
255. Id. at 692.
256. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
257. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." (quoting Thomas
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corner. 25 8 In so doing, the focus of judicial review shifted to the generality of the
law that pinches religious conduct. Apart from exceptions carved out to preserve
nuggets of existing case law, minimal scrutiny applies to religiously neutral laws
of general applicability no matter how grave the resulting restriction upon religious
conduct. The leading applications of that principle have revealed a Court divided
on the question of whether governmental purpose is relevant to whether a
challenged law is a neutral law of general applicability. In Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,26 ° Justice Kennedy could marshal only four
votes for an examination of governmental purpose, but a majority determined
neutrality and generality by reference to the effects of the statute.26' In Locke v.
Davey,262 while the Court paid attention to the effects of Washington's denial of
scholarship aid for theological instruction, the Court upheld the denial as much on
the basis of governmental purpose as effects.263 Although the exclusion singled out
religious conduct, the Court determined that Washington did not intend hostility
toward religion.264
There does not appear to be a general principle that guides the Court in its
consideration of governmental purpose. The best that can be said is that the Court
is required to take purpose into account as an inevitable result of its embrace of
tiered scrutiny but uses purpose in distinctly different ways within each level of
scrutiny, as well as across the tiers of scrutiny. In many different substantive areas,
whether the issue is individual rights or structural allocation of powers, the Court
sometimes relies on effects, sometimes on purpose, and sometimes on a
combination of the two. The Court's fractured pattern of consideration of purpose
appears to be the result of an ad hoc method unguided by any theory of the matter.
To be sure, the Court states that it will not strike down otherwise legitimate actions
simply because an illicit motive is present,265 yet its disparate impact doctrine is an
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)) (internal quotation marks) (alterations omitted)).
258. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 85.
259. For example, Sherbert remains valid in the "context... [of] individualized governmental
assessment of... conduct," Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, and when so-called hybrid claims-the marriage
of a plausible free exercise claim with a plausible claim under some other constitutional guarantee-are
united, see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 36 (1972) (upholding an Amish family's
decision to end their children's state-sponsored education after the eighth grade for religious reasons,
notwithstanding the state's substantive interest in providing a formal education to its children).
260. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
261. Id. at 542. Part II-A-3 of the Court's opinion addressed the effects of the statute sub judice,
and Justice Kennedy was joined in that Part of the case by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,
Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 522. In Part ll-A-2 of the Court's opinion, Justice Kennedy examined the
governmental purpose of the same statute, with only Justice Stevens joining. Id.
262. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
263. Id. at 720 21.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 292 (2000) (finding a city ordinance
banning public nudity was constitutional because the ordinance served a legitimate city interest despite
the allegation that the ordinance was enacted with the illicit motive of targeting a specific
establishment); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,224-25 (1971) (upholding a city ordinance to close
all city-leased pools in order to prevent the desegregation of those pools); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 130 31 (1810) (upholding a law that effected the transfer of land in which the adversely
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
attempt to do just that.266 Moreover, the Court keeps its disparate impact doctrine
confined to racial and sexual classifications in equal protection, rather than
broadening its applicability to analogous settings, such as that at issue in United
States v. O'Brien.267 Surely, the Court could do better.
IV. THE PROPER ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
When should governmental purpose be relevant to constitutional adjudication?
When purpose is relevant, how should purpose be detected? The ubiquity of tiered
scrutiny necessarily implies that judicial consideration of governmental purpose
cannot be abandoned. The practical problem is to confine judicial consideration of
governmental purpose to methods that are reliable and which emphasize the real
world impact of governmental action. If constitutional law is to be manufactured
by reliance on governmental purpose, such purposes must be accurately identified,
because once constitutional law is made, it tends to remain fixed in place. In
general, while effect should matter more than purpose, it is essential to identify
purpose in a principled manner.
Reliability is an issue when courts attempt to infer governmental purpose from
slivers of data. If induction is always an uncertain form of reasoning,268 the
possibility of error becomes greatly magnified when ajudge, removed in time and
space from the legislature or executive, attempts to ascribe a purpose to the action
taken by a complex body. As the late Chief Justice Warren noted, "Inquiries into
congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter." '269 The Chief Justice
continued, "What motivates one legislator ... is not necessarily what motivates
scores of others . . . and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew
guesswork.,, 270 Nor was Earl Warren the first Chief Justice to voice these
misgivings. The iconic John Marshall stated much the same concerns in Fletcher
affected party challenged the law on the grounds that some of the legislators voting for the law did so
because they were promised an interest in the land).
266. See supra notes 99 101 and accompanying text.
267. 391 U.S. 367, 382 86 (1968).
268. See supra pp. 16-17.
269. O'brien, 391 U.S. at 383.
270. Id. at 384.
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v. Peck,271 and they have been repeated in more recent years,272 but no Justice has
provided a more thorough catalogue of the obstacles to ascertaining the inferential
purposes or motives of a legislature than Justice Antonin Scalia.
71
271. Chief Justice Marshall noted,
It may well be doubted how far the validity of a law depends upon the motives of
its framers, and how far the particular inducements [to governmental action] are
examinable in a court ofjustice. If the principle be conceded, that [governmental
action] might be declared null by a court, in consequence of the means which
procured it, still would there be much difficulty in saying to what extent those
means must be applied to produce this effect.... Must the vitiating cause operate
on a majority, or on what number of the members?
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810).
272. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) ("It is difficult or impossible for
any court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators.
Furthermore, there is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad
motives of its supporters. If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its facial
content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body
repassed it for different reasons."); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring) ("[T]his Court has consistently held that it is not for us to invalidate a statute because of our
views that the 'motives' behind its passage were improper it is simply too difficult to determine what
those motives were.").
273. Justice Scalia outlined the difficulties of discerning governmental purpose in his dissent:
[W]hile it is possible to discern the objective "purpose" of a statute ([i.e.], the
public good at which its provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal
motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth... discerning the
subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is . . . almost always an
impossible task. The number of possible motivations, to begin with, is not...
finite.... [A] particular legislator need not have voted for the Act either because
he wanted to foster religion or because he wanted to improve education. He may
have thought the bill would provide jobs for his district, or may have wanted to
make amends with a faction of his party he had alienated on another vote, or he
may have been a close friend of the bill's sponsor, or he may have been repaying
a favor he owed the majority leader, or he may have hoped the Governor would
appreciate his vote and make a fundraising appearance for him, or he may have
been pressured to vote for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor or by a flood
of constituent mail, or he may have been seeking favorable publicity, or he may
have been reluctant to hurt the feelings of a loyal staff member who worked on
the bill, or he may have been settling an old score with a legislator who opposed
the bill, or he may have been mad at his wife who opposed the bill, or he may
have been intoxicated and utterly unmotivated when the vote was called, or he
may have accidentally voted "yes" instead of"no," or, ofcourse, he may have had
(and very likely did have) a combination of some of the above and many other
motivations. To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably
to look for something that does not exist.
... [Nor can we] assume that every member present (if, as is unlikely, we
know who or even how many they were) agreed with the motivation expressed in
a particular legislator's preenactment floor or committee statement .... Can we
assume, then, that they all agree with the motivation expressed in the staff-
prepared committee reports they might have read . . . ? Should we consider
postenactment floor statements? Or postenactment testimony from legislators,
obtained expressly for the lawsuit? Should we consider media reports on the
realities of the legislative bargaining? All of these sources, of course, are
eminently manipulable. Legislative histories can be contrived and sanitized,
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The task is impossible, even for the Olympians of the Supreme Court. What is
not impossible, however, is to ascertain purpose from the face of the governmental
action involved or even from a comparison of the government' s stated purpose with
the means chosen to achieve that purpose. A radical disconnection between stated
purposes and chosen means might be sufficient to cause judges to doubt that the
stated purposes are the actual purposes, but that should cause them to first focus on
the effects of the action. An example is Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah.74 Hialeah's stated purpose for its narrow ban on ritual slaughter of
animals was to preserve public morals, peace, and safety.275 The chosen means,
however, permitted almost all ritual slaughter except that practiced by the Santeria
sect.276 This sharp disconnection between stated ends and chosen means caused the
Court to focus on the effect of the measure, which was to outlaw the sacramental
rite of the Santerians.2 77 This effect should have been sufficient to invalidate the
measure. Even if further inquiry into purpose might be made, the purpose of the
measure could be inferred from its effect. There was no need to inquire into motive
evidence, as did five Justices,2 even though the motive evidence was strikingly
clear.
The consequences ofmistakenj udicial readings of purpose in cases of statutory
construction or executive action are much less significant than in constitutional
adjudication. Legislatures and executives can correct these mistaken impressions.
favorable media coverage orchestrated, and postenactment recollections
conveniently distorted. Perhaps most valuable of all would be more objective
indications-for example, evidence regarding the individual legislators' religious
affiliations. And if that, why not evidence regarding the fervor or tepidity of their
beliefs?
Having achieved, through these simple means, an assessment of what
individual legislators intended, we must still confront the question (yet to be
addressed in any of our cases) how many of them must have the invalidating
intent. If a state senate approves a bill by vote of 26 to 25, and only one of the 26
intended solely to advance religion, is the law unconstitutional? What if 13 of the
26 had that intent? What if 3 of the 26 had the impermissible intent, but 3 of the
25 voting against the bill were motivated by religious hostility or were simply
attempting to "balance" the votes of their impermissibly motivated colleagues?
Or is it possible that the intent of the bill's sponsor is alone enough to invalidate
it-on a theory, perhaps, that even though everyone else's intent was pure, what
they produced was the fruit of a forbidden tree?
... [T]here are no good answers to these questions .... [D]etermining the
subjective intent of legislators is a perilous enterprise. It is perilous, I might note,
notjust for the judges who will very likely reach the wrong result, but also for the
legislators who find that they must assess the validity of proposed
legislation and risk the condemnation of having voted for an unconstitutional
measure not on the basis of what the legislation contains, nor even on the basis
of what they themselves intend, but on the basis of what others have in mind.
Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
274. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
275. Id. at 528.
276. See id. at 542-45.
277. Id. at 542.
278. See id. at 543 46.
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But when constitutional law is crafted on the basis of a mistaken view of purpose,
the mistake endures. Such mistakes affect not only the specific case but others that
look like the adjudicated case. Mistakes even affect cases that bear no resemblance
to the original one because the fortune-telling methodology that spawned the
original mistake has been legitimized. An example is United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno.279 When Congress enacted the Food Stamp Act, its stated
purpose was to alleviate hunger and malnutrition among the poor.28 When
Congress amended the law to deny food stamps to households composed of
unrelated persons, it failed to state a purpose but later argued that the purpose was
to prevent fraud.2 8' The Court first concluded that the amendment was "clearly
irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act." '282 The Court then vaulted from that to
a conclusion that the actual purpose of Congress-as revealed by pinpricks of
motive evidence-was "to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from
participating in the food stamp program." '2 83 That motive, however accurate, was
declared to be an illegitimate, "bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group," '284 despite the government's assertion that its actual purpose was
to minimize fraud and abuse of the program. If that mode of purpose detection is
appropriate, why should it not also apply to instances of economic discrimination
against politically unpopular groups, such as vendors of fast food or tobacco? It is
not enough to say that those entities inflict external costs by their activities, for so
does abuse of the food stamp program. Nor is it enough to say that the actual
purpose of legislation detrimental to fast food vendors is far more likely to be in
pursuit of a public good than denying food stamps to households of unrelated
persons. Rationing public funds to help only financially hard-pressed kinship
families avoid hunger is as legitimate a public good as deterring the availability of
unhealthy food or addictive, death-dealing tobacco products. The fact that the
Moreno method has not triggered a flood of imitation is small cause to celebrate.
Justice Jackson's loaded weapon metaphor is as apt here as it was in Korematsu v.
United States.285
The general problem of reliability is compounded in cases of ineffective
purpose or unintended consequences. To use Justice Scalia's example, "if bizarre
new historical evidence revealed that [the Clayton Act] lacked a secular purpose,
even though it has no discernible nonsecular effect, '286 it would make no sense to
279. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
280. Id. at 529.
281. Id. at 535 36.
282. Id. at 534.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the dislocation and internment of Japanese residents on the
reasoning that it was necessary for national security during World War II). In dissent, Justice Jackson
characterized the reasoning of the Court as creating a "loaded weapon" ready for future use. Id. at 246
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
286. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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strike it down because of its ineffective purpose.287 A somewhat different problem
is presented in cases of unintended consequences. When the District of Columbia
police force began to use a test of verbal and written ability to screen applicants, 88
it is fair to presume it did not do so to inflict racial disadvantage. Yet, that was the
effect of the test. Given that effect, it is fair to go back and question the initial
presumption that the test was not intended to produce this effect. That is what the
disparate impact doctrine seeks to do. The puzzle is why the Court has not extended
this mode of reasoning to other doctrinal areas where observable effects produce
constitutional disadvantage. Unintended effects are not confined to cases of racial
or sexual disparate impact.
While ineffective purpose and unintended effects provide a starting point for
determining when courts should consider governmental purpose, they do not end
the inquiry. Of equal importance is the manner in which courts should determine
purpose in those circumstances in which they must assess the government's
purpose. Consideration of the manner in which purpose ought to be divined, and
application of that inquiry to cases of ineffective purpose and unintended
consequences, goes a long way toward construction of some general principles to
guide judicial examination of governmental purpose.
A. Determining Governmental Purpose
Given that tiered scrutiny requires assessment of governmental purpose, one
may profitably "round up the usual suspects," in the immortal words of Captain
Louis Renault,289 and subject them to academic grilling. Minimal scrutiny purports
to rely upon any conceivable, hypothetical purpose to establish the requisite
legitimate governmental objective. This may be supplied after the fact, but it can
also be divined by reference to the action itself. Then-Justice William Rehnquist's
argument that the "plain language of [the statute] marks the beginning and end of
our inquiry ' was criticized as a supposed tautology29'-Congress intends to do
what it does but the criticism is not as apt as the critics suppose. Justice Rehnquist
may have meant that courts should determine purpose by reference to the effects
of the action; if those effects are not constitutionally suspect, there is no reason to
287. 1 do not contend that cases of ineffective purpose should always result in upholding the
government's action. Some ineffective purposes inflict stigmatic injury and thus ought to be voided
because the hortatory purpose actually has stigmatic effects. An example would be a government
proclamation that "the United States is a Christian nation." Assuming no tangible effects attached to the
proclamation, the governmental purpose of establishing a cultural and religious hegemony is ineffective,
but the very announcement inflicts stigmatic injury on non-Christian Americans. Whether this is really
a case of ineffective purpose is open to debate; perhaps the government's purpose would be to inflict
such symbolic injury. Such a debate is a fool's paradise, though, for the reasons Justice Scalia
developed at length in his Edwards dissent. See supra note 273.
288. See supra notes 99 101 and accompanying text.
289. CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942). Claude Rains, of course, performed as the
inimitable Captain Renault.
290. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 (1980).
291. Id. at 186 87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 59: 1
2007] CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSE 41
search for an alternative purpose. In short, he may have meant his comment as a
shorthand expression of the futility of invalidating otherwise valid statutes because
they are ineffective to achieve an occult, illicit purpose. Justice Rehnquist may have
also meant that if the statutory provision does not expose itself as illegitimate, any
plausible-albeit hypothetical-legitimate purpose for it will suffice. The former
possibility divines purpose from effects; the latter possibility locates purpose in a
universe of plausible supposition, which is tantamount to a rejection of any search
for purpose.
In United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, Justice Brennan argued
that courts should start with the legislatively stated purpose and uphold
classifications that rationally further such purpose, except when the means are
"either irrelevant to or counter to that purpose. '292 In such a case, the measure is
valid only if the means are "rationally related to achievement of an actual
legitimate governmental purpose." '293 Mischief can begin here. Stated purposes are
useful and made more so by doctrine announcing that the Court will consider stated
purposes. The trouble begins when the chosen means are disconnected from the
stated purposes. Although a sharp dissociation of stated purposes and effects cannot
be ignored, if the effects are not constitutionally suspicious, one is entitled to
wonder why it matters that the legislature has badly or even falsely stated its
purposes. If legitimate purposes exist, even if the legislature failed to articulate or
deliberately concealed them, what constitutional harm has occurred?294 While a
search for actual purpose may sometimes reveal an illegitimate purpose that is
effectively accomplished, if purpose is inferred from motive evidence, Justice
Brennan's approach would plunge the courts into the endless difficulties of
inferring actual purpose from motive.295
Justice Stevens, in Fritz, argued for a judicial quest for the discovery of "a
correlation between the classification and either the actual purpose of the statute or
a legitimate purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an
impartial legislature." '296  This middle-of-the-road position is hardly less
objectionable. Here, actual purpose serves only to invalidate statutes or at least
subject them to heightened scrutiny and it is only if the Court fails to produce a
damning, imagined actual purpose that the presumption of an impartial purpose
292. Id. at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
293. Id.
294. The sports-minded of a certain age will be reminded of the phrase coined by the immortal
Chick Hearn, long-time radio play-by-play announcer for the Los Angeles Lakers: "No harm, no foul."
For a discussion of the origins of the phrase "no harm, no foul," see Linda E. Carter, The Sporting
Approach to Harmless Error in Criminal Cases: The Supreme Court's "No Harm, No Foul" Debacle
in Neder v. United States, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 229, 230 n.3 (2001).
295. In both United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), and
Fritf, 449 U.S. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting), Justice Brennan leaped immediately to motive evidence
as the touchstone for actual purpose.
296. 449 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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would be relevant.2 97 This is an invitation to expediency, for one could always
proffer motive evidence sufficient to strike down distasteful government actions.
Of course, these inferred actual purposes must be plausible, so there is an outer
limit to such chicanery; but within a broad spectrum of contested cases, the
opportunity for judicial abuse is present.
Once the level of scrutiny is heightened, the tables of proof are turned, and it
is the government that mustjustify the legitimacy of its actions by establishing the
requisite connection between its means and an important or compelling objective.
Identification of actual purpose is essential to decision under heightened scrutiny,
at least in equal protection cases.2 98 Yet, for the most part, the divination of actual
purpose in such cases is by reference to the classification itself,299 the application
of the classification, 00 or the effects produced by the classification. O' Although the
doctrine of heightened scrutiny in equal protection erects no barriers to judicial
rummaging for inferred actual purpose, there are surprisingly few instances of the
Court doing so, even under circumstances where it might be appropriate. 0 2 The
curious result is that the Court appears to be at least as likely to rely upon its own
ideas of governmental purpose under minimal scrutiny as under heightened
scrutiny.
Reliance on stated purposes also serves a useful quasi-constitutional function.
The Court has imposed a series of clear statement requirements on Congress, which
are designed both to give fair notice to the states of congressional action that
invades traditional understandings of state sovereignty and to ensure that Congress
does not inadvertently displace state autonomy. Congress must be clear and
unambiguous when it intends to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity;0 3 when it uses its commerce power to regulate states with respect to
matters that are "fundamental... for a sovereign";30 4 when it acts to preempt areas
297. Id. ("If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its
impartiality would be suspect. If, however, the adverse impact may reasonably be viewed as an
acceptable cost of achieving a larger goal, an impartial lawmaker could rationally decide that that cost
should be incurred.").
298. As discussed previously, when courts apply intermediate and strict scrutiny to free speech
issues, they lose much of their focus on actual purpose and concentrate far more on the effects of the
regulation at issue. See supra text accompanying notes 137 38.
299. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2001).
300. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
301. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 18 (1977) (per curiam).
302. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (reversing a custody assignment where there
existed an inference that the lower court exclusively used an interracial relationship between the child's
mother and stepfather as its reason for awarding custody to the natural father); see also infra text
accompanying notes 332 41 (discussing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971)).
303. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (affirming the well-
established requirement that Congress use clear and unmistakable language in any statute abrogating
a state's immunity from being sued in federal court).
304. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 61 (1991).
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historically reserved for state regulation;30 5 when it attaches conditions to federal
grants to the states;30 6 and, in general, whenever it "intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government. The clear
statement principle is a rule of statutory construction, but its function is both to
ensure that Congress does not inadvertently invade state autonomy and to avoid the
necessity of deciding delicate issues of the outer bounds of congressional authority
to displace state authority.0 8
The clear statement principle is not confined to federalism concerns. Professor
Cass Sunstein argues that when issues of individual rights are pitted against
executive authority, the Court insists upon a clear and unambiguous congressional
grant to the President of such authority.0 9 In so doing, the Court has eschewed the
argument that when it comes to national security, foreign affairs, and prosecution
of authorized armed force, the President has broad discretion to interpret ambiguous
grants of authority.310 Professor Sunstein refers to this as "liberty-promoting
minimalism," a device to give the benefit of doubt to individual liberty while
avoiding decision upon the outer limits of the President's exclusive or unilateral
authority in these areas. 1' The clear statement principle operates here in a fashion
analogous to the federalism cases but also serves another quasi-constitutional
function preserving liberty without judicial exercise of the constitutional trump
cards of the liberty-protecting provisions of the Constitution.
305. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (asserting that the police
powers of the states could not be superseded by congressional action unless that was Congress's clear
purpose).
306. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2006)
(stating that although Congress may attach conditions to states' acceptance of federal money, the
presence of the conditions must be unambiguous); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)
(citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)) (explaining that Congress
must unambiguously set out conditions attached to a state's acceptance of federal funding to allow the
state to make a fully informed decision about acceptance).
307. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at 242) (internal quotation marks omitted) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to exclude states from within
the statutory definition of "person").
308. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 172-73 (2001 ) (acknowledging that the clear statement requirement for congressional actions that
push the outer limits of federal authority is in part motivated by the Court's desire to avoid delicate
constitutional issues); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 58 (2000) (recognizing that it is the
duty of the Court to reject an interpretation of a statute that creates serious constitutional issues when
another construction is available that avoids the issues); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50
(1971) (refusing to interpret a federal statute to allow the exertion of federal control over local criminal
conduct in the absence of express congressional intent to alter the normal federal state balance of
power); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (holding that a broad interpretation of a
federal statute, which would disturb the traditional federal-state relationship, would not be adopted
where there was neither legislative history nor statutory language supporting a broad construction of
the statute).
309. Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond,
2006 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 1 (2006).
310. Id. at 5.
311. Id. at 1.
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Clear statement requirements are only quasi-constitutional; it is thus ironic that
the Court will use unreliable motive evidence to infer actual purpose when making
constitutional decisions but will reject that approach when seeking to avoid difficult
constitutional decisions. If inferences of actual purpose are reliable when the stakes
are high-constitutional interpretation that is difficult to alter-why is it treated as
unreliable when the stakes are lower statutory construction or tentative
conclusions about executive authority that Congress could alter at its pleasure, with
enough votes to override a veto? While the Court offers no answer, there is a
theoretical answer of sorts. Unfortunately, that answer, which can be seen by
considering Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,312 suggests that the Court has its purpose inquiry
backwards.
The central question in Hamdan can be presented in different ways or on
different levels. If the question is couched as whether Congress intended by its
September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force313 to authorize the
President to subject detainees to military tribunals that do not conform to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, there can be only one of two answers: yes or no.
While considerably difficult to discern the answer, in theory an answer could be
discerned. The possibilities are binary-the one excludes the other. If that question
is answered in the affirmative, however, the Hamdan question necessarily becomes
a constitutional one. And if purpose is relevant to answer the constitutional
question, one might ask whether Congress intended to enable the President to keep
the nation secure from j ihad or whether Congress intended to enable the President
to incarcerate indefinitely and subject to military tribunals anybody he might
remotely suspect of aiding jihadist terrorists? The answer to that question is not
binary; Congress might have had both intentions. While the former is surely a
legitimate purpose, the latter is not. Thus, examination of purpose in the
constitutional context is a considerably more vexed inquiry, a fact that partially
explains the nature of the Court's disparate impact doctrine in equal protection
cases. Adding to the epistemological discomfort is the fact that there can be any
number of overlapping motivations that occur in constitutional cases, but for every
issue of statutory construction, there can be only two, mutually exclusive
possibilities. The import of this is that the problem of reliable ascertainment of
purpose is greatly increased when constitutional decisions hang on determination
of purpose. Because of the decreased reliability of any form of purpose
ascertainment in constitutional adjudication, in such cases the Court should be
particularly unwilling to resort to its least reliable method of determining
purpose-inference of actual intent from motive evidence. By contrast, in cases of
statutory construction, there is more room for error because of the relative ease
of correcting judicial error and the Court should be more willing to experiment
with less reliable techniques of ascertaining intent. Alas, the Court's process is the
opposite.
312. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
313. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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This incoherent pattern would be ameliorated if the Court extracted
governmental purpose, whether hypothetical or actual, primarily from the face of
the action and its effects, and secondarily from the government's stated purpose.
Attempts to infer actual purpose should be restricted to a few exceptional
categories, designed mostly to deal with the problem of concealing forbidden
purposes behind the cloak of unintended consequences.314
B. Ineffective Purpose
When government action is not effective to accomplish its purpose, should it
matter that the purpose is illegitimate? Should the answer depend on the manner in
which purpose is determined?
In United States v. O'Brien, Chief Justice Warren opined that it would be futile
to invalidate otherwise valid laws due to an illegitimate purpose, because the
legislature could simply reenact the law without any evidence of impure purpose.'
15
Invalidation on such grounds would amount to a remand to the legislature with a
not-so-subtle invitation to be less candid the second time around. Creating
incentives for legislatures to act on carefully concealed purposes hardly seems a
good idea.
Moreover, the presence of an illicit purpose does not automatically mean that
what the legislature did is condemnable. It would be foolish to invalidate a law
punishing copyright infringement because Congress declared that its purpose was
to suppress free speech. Years ago, Professors Tussman and tenBroek confronted
this issue and concluded that "it is altogether possible for a law which is the
expression of a forbidden motive to be a good law." '316 Considered in this section
is the problem of ineffective purposes; if the effect of a law that is infected with a
bad purpose is benign, there is generally no good reason to condemn it.
There are, however, at least two exceptions to this principle. Some expressions
of purpose may be inherently injurious; thus, it cannot be said that there are
absolutely no evil effects, and the problem is no longer one of ineffective purpose.
Or, to parse the point a bit more finely, while the law inflicts no tangible
injury-and thus produces no wrongful effects-its purpose sends a message that
is so counter to constitutional values and so likely to wreak psychic offense that its
poison must be expunged. A joint resolution of Congress declaring "White
Supremacy Day," while of no tangible effect, would be a venting of such poison.
The other exception is rooted in the limitations of courts. When courts are not
314. See infra text accompanying notes 332 41.
315. 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968). The evidence of impermissible purpose in O'Brien consisted of
statements by members of Congress that the proposed amendment to the Selective Service law would
suppress draft card burning as a form of protesting the Vietnam War. Id. app. at 386-88. Chief Justice
Warren noted that if the Court were to strike down the amendment on the ground of such illicit purpose,
it "could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about
it." Id. at 384.
316. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 360 (1949).
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capable of assessing whether the means chosen to accomplish an illegitimate
purpose are effective, it is appropriate to invalidate the law because of its bad
purpose, or at least subject it to heightened scrutiny. This is a prophylactic approach
to evil effects. Of course, before courts leap to invoke this exception, they should
be certain of the illegitimate purpose. To the extent illegitimate purpose is divined
by unreliably inferring actual intent from shards of motive evidence, a court should
be extremely reluctant to strike it down.
1. Stigmatic Injury
When an illegitimate purpose, by itself, causes stigmatic injury, the resulting
injury warrants invalidation of the government action. The endorsement test for
violations of the Establishment Clause, for example, is entirely rooted in this
notion. Justice O'Connor, who originated the theory, asserted,
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing
in the political community. Government can run afoul of that
prohibition .... [by] endorsement or disapproval of religion.
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message." 7
Of course, not everyone agrees the endorsement test is an adequate way to deal with
such stigmatic injury. Justice Thomas rejects the endorsement test in favor of a
hard-shell brand of "actual legal coercion '  as the "touchstone
for... Establishment Clause inquiry."'3 19 To be sure, Justice Thomas objects to the
endorsement test, not so much because it renders a false positive for stigmatic
injury, but because its application, no matter the outcome, may produce such
injury. 20 To avoid this Hobson's choice, Justice Thomas proffers an analysis based
317. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
318. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring inthejudgment)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
319. Id. at 697 (Thomas, J., concurring).
320. Justice Thomas contended that
[endorsement] analysis is not fully satisfying to either nonadherents or adherents.
For the nonadherent, who may well be more sensitive than the hypothetical
"reasonable observer," ... this test fails to capture completely the honest and
deeply felt offense he takes from the government conduct. For the adherent, this
analysis takes no account of the message sent by removal of the sign or display,
which may well appear to him to be an act hostile to his religious faith. The
Court's foray into religious meaning either gives insufficient weight to the views
of nonadherents and adherents alike, or it provides no principled way to choose
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entirely upon the effects of governmental action.
In the end, the problem with the endorsement test may be that it relies too much
on subjective indicators of purpose, for a great deal turns on what purpose the
mythical reasonable observer would attribute to government action. Yet, whatever
problems may bedevil the endorsement test, the problem of stigmatic purpose
remains. This problem is most readily exemplified when a government actually
declares its illegitimate purpose, although this is unlikely to occur. Far more likely
is a form of government action that combines a forbidden purpose as one
motivating factor with a legitimate purpose as another, or one that is ineffective to
achieve the purpose all together. Consider two cases in this regard.
In American Family Ass 'n v. City & County of San Francisco,32' the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the San Francisco Board of Supervisors did not violate the
Establishment Clause by passing resolutions that officially condemned the views
of "religious organizations '3 2  such as "the Religious Right"3 23 or by characterizing
the group's views as "erroneous and full of lies. 3 24 The Board's resolutions were
a response to an advertisement that the plaintiffs placed in the San Francisco
Chronicle as part of their "Truth in Love" campaign, which stated,
Christians love homosexuals[;] [although] "God abhors any form
of sexual sin . . . [, we offer] an open hand [of] healing for
homosexuals, not harassment. We want reason in this debate, not
rhetoric. And we want to share the hope we have in Christ, for
those who feel acceptance of homosexuality is their only hope.
25
The Board's resolution asserted that advertising of the sort used by the
plaintiffs helped to "'create an atmosphere which validates oppression of gays and
lesbians' and encourages maltreatment of them. The Resolution claimed a 'marked
increase in anti-gay violence' that coincided with 'defamatory and erroneous
campaigns' against gays and lesbians. 3 26 The Ninth Circuit ostensibly used the
Lemon test to conclude that the plaintiffs did not present a claim because "there
[was] no actual or threatened imposition of government power or sanction. 3 2 1 The
court reached its conclusion by injecting the endorsement test into its assessment
of the Lemon test's primary effects prong: "We believe a reasonable, objective
observer would view the primary effect of [the Board's resolutions] as encouraging
equal rights for gays and discouraging hate crimes, and any statements from which
between those views. In sum, this Court's effort to assess religious meaning is
fraught with futility.
Id. at 696 97 (Thomas, J., concurring).
321. 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
322. Id. at 1119 (quoting a letter sent by the Board to the plaintiffs and others regarding the
Board's disapproval ofthe plaintiffs' "Truth in Love" ad campaign) (internal quotation marks omitted).
323. Id. (quoting S.F. Board Res. No. 234-99 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
324. Id. at 1120 (quoting S.F. Board Res. No. 873-98 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
325. Id. at 1119 (quoting the plaintiffs' advertisement in the San Francisco Chronicle).
326. Id. at 1120 (quoting S.F. Board Res. No. 873-98 (1998)).
327. Id. at 1125.
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disapproval [of religion] can be inferred [are] only incidental and ancillary." '328 In
his dissent, Judge Noonan argued that the resolution constituted a forbidden
endorsement and offered the following analogy:
Suppose a city council today, in the year 2002, adopted a
resolution condemning Islam because its teachings embraced the
concept of a holy war and so, the resolution said, were "directly
correlated" with the bombing of the World Trade Center.
Plausibly the purpose might be to discourage terror bombings.
Would any reasonable, informed observer doubt that the primary
effect of such an action by a city could be the expression of
official hostility to the religion practiced by a billion people?
29
As a long-time resident of San Francisco, I nominate myself as a reasonable,
informed observer. I think it quite likely that the Board of Supervisors was
motivated in roughly equal parts by a desire to endorse equal rights for
homosexuals and by a desire to condemn Christian fundamentalists for what the
Board believed to be ignorant bigotry. The former purpose is legitimate; the latter
is not. The illegitimate purpose does not produce any tangible inj ury but may inflict
stigmatic injury. The Court of Appeals, of course, did not see it this way. The
majority of the circuit panel perceived no illegitimate purpose and thought that the
plaintiffs suffered no inj ury.33 ° Judge Noonan, however, perceived injury by relying
on the endorsement test's focus on the effects of government action upon a
reasonable, informed observer.3 ' Existing doctrine forced the judges of the circuit
panel to speak in the vernacular of the Lemon and endorsement tests, but one
presents a clearer picture by confining the issue to the effects of the action, without
reference to its suppositional effect upon mythical observers. The plaintiffs did not
incur any coercive harm; at most they suffered the sting of being treated as
"outsiders, not full members ofthe political community. 33 2 Though this conclusion
would be enough to constitute forbidden endorsement, that test relies on the
premise that courts can detect forbidden purpose through hypothesized effects upon
hypothesized observers. This detection method is highly subjective and little more
than a proxy for inferential purpose inquiry.
A court would do better to focus upon real effects. Absent real coercion, the
effects are slight. Moreover, the purposes are mixed. If a court voided the San
Francisco resolutions, what would prevent San Francisco from reenacting
differently worded versions, ones that make plain that San Francisco respects
Christian fundamentalist beliefs, but point out that the effect of those beliefs is to
deny equal rights for homosexuals and to inadvertently encourage hate crimes? The
328. Id. at 1122-23.
329. Id. at 1127 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 1125-26.
331. Id. at 1126-27 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
332. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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net result of this remand for forbidden purpose would require San Francisco to
rephrase its resolutions in a more polite and inclusive fashion. While this might
mitigate the stigmatic injury the endorsement test seeks to identify and punish,
perhaps it is too much effort for too little reward.
Palmer v. Thompson333 may be a rare case of ineffectual purpose to deliver
racially discriminatory results, but which, nevertheless, produced stigmatic injury
that should have been addressed. The Supreme Court, however, did not analyze the
problem in this fashion. In the wake of ajudicial decree that Jackson, Mississippi's
racial segregation of its public recreational facilities violated equal protection,
Jackson integrated all of those facilities except its five swimming pools, four of
which had been reserved for whites and one for blacks." 4 Jackson closed all five
swimming pools because the city council thought that the pools "could not be
operated safely and economically on an integrated basis.""33 Although the Court
admitted that there was evidence to support the contention that "the Jackson pools
were closed because of ideological opposition to racial integration in swimming
pools,"3 '6 it deferred to the lower courts' determination that the real purpose of the
closure was to preserve public safety and fiscal responsibility.337 One need not be
a cynic to think that in 1963, the same year that federal troops suppressed a riot
over the enrollment of James Meredith as the sole black student at the University
of Mississippi, racial animus towards African Americans motivated Jackson's
closure of its municipal swimming pools. Although the action taken affected whites
and blacks equally, this was the same bogus equality that the Court struck down in
Loving v. Virginia.38 The Court might have reasoned that the effect of the closure
was to inflict stigmatic injury on African Americans by declaring them unfit to
swim with whites. In Loving, the Court thought that because Virginia's ban on
racially mixed marriages only applied to marriages with a white participant, the
face of the statute revealed a purpose "to maintain White Supremacy." '39 While no
such facial asymmetry existed in Jackson's closure,340 its evident effect, at the
height of southern white resistance to the recognition of the social and political
equality of blacks and whites, was to inflict serious stigmatic harm upon black
citizens. The resulting stigmatic harm should have been enough to cause the Court
to carefully parse the record for evidence of a forbidden purpose, evidence that the
Court admitted existed. 4'
333. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
334. Id. at 218-19.
335. Id. at 225.
336. Id. at 224 25.
337. Id. at 225.
338. 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) ("[W]e reject the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute
containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth
Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations ... .
339. Id. at 11.
340. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 220.
341. Id. at224 25.
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At the very least, such evidence should have triggered the sort of scrutiny
prescribed in Washington v. Davis.342 Whether it would have been sufficient to void
the closure outright, or merely reverse the presumption of validity, is debatable.
What is far less debatable is that the Court should not have ignored the admitted
evidence of racial animus as a purpose for Jackson's action.
2. Inability to Assess Effectiveness of Means to Achieve a Forbidden
Purpose
When courts are not capable of assessing whether the means chosen to
accomplish an illegitimate purpose are effective, they should strike down the
government's action on the basis ofthe illegitimate purpose. Of course, the wisdom
of this prescription depends in part on the method by which courts determine the
presence of an illegitimate purpose. To test the application of this principle,
consider a sampling of Dormant Commerce Clause cases.
City ofPhiladelphia v. New Jersey,343 which established the modern parameters
for application of strict scrutiny to state regulations of interstate commerce, 344 is
thought to be a paradigmatic example of the Court's reliance upon effects rather
than purpose, but the Court did not actually examine the effects of the New Jersey
law at issue."4 True, the law discriminated facially against interstate commerce, but
there was no proof that it delivered effects that discriminated against interstate
commerce.346 An assessment of effects, however, was beyond judicial competence,
for it would have required a complex empirical calculation that would challenge
even the most skilled economist. In circumstances where measurement of the actual
effects of a measure are beyond judicial competence, it is appropriate for the Court
to rely on facial indications of a suspicious means as reason enough to trigger strict
scrutiny.
Not every Dormant Commerce Clause case can be resolved so neatly. When
state regulations are facially neutral concerning interstate commerce, the Court
faces a difficult analytical dilemma. Should strict scrutiny apply ifthe Court detects
illegitimate protectionist purposes, discriminatory effects, or both; or should the
regulations be presumed to be valid and issues of purpose and effects simply be
factors taken into account in conducting Pike balancing? 347 The Court has no
consistent answer to this problem. In Dean Milk Co. v. City ofMadison,348 the Court
accepted Madison's purpose as legitimate but reasoned, from the effects of the
342. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964))
("[R]acial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the
weightiest of considerations.").
343. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
344. Id. at 624.
345. See id. at 625 29.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 198-201.
347. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
348. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
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ordinance, that an early form of strict scrutiny should apply.349 In Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,350 the Court examined the effects
of a North Carolina law-the Court recognized indications that the law was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose-to strike down the law under a murky
amalgam of Pike balancing and strict scrutiny. 5' In such classic cases as Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan3 52 and Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp. of Delaware, the Court examined effects in order to apply Pike balancing,
but the Court sometimes ascribes a protectionist purpose to state laws that, though
facially evenhanded, have the effect of discriminating against interstate
commerce.
3 54
If a court can detect discrimination against interstate commerce by examining
the effects of the regulation, as seems to be the case in Dean Milk, there is no good
reason to inquire into purpose. However, if the effects of the challenged action do
not readily reveal such discrimination, there may be more reason to probe the
government's purposes. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond..s appears to be such
a case. New York officials denied Hood a license to open a new milk receiving
plant in New York because they thought Hood would increase the amount of milk
it exported to Massachusetts, even though Hood remained free to receive unlimited
quantities of New York milk at its existing New York plants."5 6 In essence, the
Court applied a prophylactic rule: If the Court is not certain whether a law
effectively discriminates against interstate commerce, but there is evidence in the
record that strongly suggests a protectionist purpose, it will strike the law down to
avoid possible resulting harm.157 The Court's rationale in Hood makes sense. A
protectionist purpose, if ineffective, causes no harm; but if courts cannot adequately
assess the effects that facially neutral laws may have on interstate commerce, they
should scour the record for evidence of a forbidden purpose. There is more warrant
for doing so in the unique area of the Dormant Commerce Clause than other areas
of constitutional law because the Court's rulings in these cases are only provisional.
Dormant Commerce Clause cases always arise when Congress has not spoken to
the issue. Congress can always use its affirmative power under the Commerce
Clause to authorize states to do what the Court has said they cannot do in the
absence of congressional action or to preempt state regulatory authority over
matters the Court has said the states may regulate in the absence of any
349. Id. at 354.
350. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
351. Id. at 350-54.
352. 325 U.S. 761,771-84 (1945).
353. 450 U.S. 662, 669 75 (1981).
354. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 96 (1994) (invalidating a
Massachusetts law requiring out-of-state dairy farmers to make "premium payments" that would
effectively negate any competitive advantage over in-state farmers); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 542 45 (1949) (striking down as unconstitutional a New York statute that
operated to lower the volume of milk traveling into New York through interstate commerce).
355. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
356. Id. at 526-29.
357. See id. at 542 44.
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congressional action. Because Dormant Commerce Clause decisions merely
apportion the burden of persuading Congress to act, there is much less reason to
worry that the Court will misread governmental purpose.
C. Unintended Consequences
Governmental purpose is relevant to cases where the effects of government
action appear to produce unconstitutional harm. Sometimes those effects are merely
adventitious by-products of entirely legitimate governmental action,3 58 but
sometimes they result from an illegitimate purpose.159 The equal protection doctrine
identifies illegitimate purposes primarily from the face of the action360 or the
discriminatory application of a facially legitimate law. 6' Only the disparate impact
cases rely on circumstantial evidence of governmental purpose. Surely the Court
should probe the government's purpose for actions that produce effects that appear
to be constitutionally harmful. Were the Court to simply shrug off such effects by
reference to some claimed legitimate purpose for the action, the government could
easily mask its true, and illegitimate, reasons for acting. The puzzle is why the
Court has not extended its disparate impact doctrine beyond the equal protection
arena.
United States v. O'Brien.62 is the perfect example of a case where the sort of
purpose inquiry contemplated by the disparate impact cases should apply. One
effect of the ban on destruction of a draft card was to make criminal a form of
political protest. 63 Of course, this effect might have been the unavoidable by-
product of a purely legitimate purpose: protecting government records and ensuring
that draft eligible men could readily produce evidence of their draft status. 64 The
Court held that the law effectively carried out the latter of these two purposes and
denied O'Brien any opportunity to invoke strict scrutiny of the law by proving that
358. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,234 36 (1972) (holding that a Wisconsin statute
mandating school attendance was unconstitutional as applied to Amish parents who refused to send their
children to school on religious grounds).
359. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 541
(1993) (finding a governmental purpose of hostility towards Santeria in the city's ordinance banning
certain killings of animals).
360. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (observing that Virginia's
express attempt was "to afford VMI's unique type of program to men and not women" (quoting United
States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944) (holding that the Democratic Party's resolution excluding blacks
from voting was state action within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment).
361. See, e.g., City ofCleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,447 (1985) (observing that
Cleburne required a special multifamily housing permit for Cleburne Living Center, a group home for
the mentally retarded, but not for "apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses[,
or] fraternity or sorority houses"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-11 (1966) (noting
that the reading and writing requirements for voting registration were only applied to blacks).
362. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
363. See Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use Regulation
Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (1988).
364. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378 82.
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a motivating factor was the desire to punish antiwar protestors. 65 The Court must
think that its intermediate form of scrutiny is adequate to deal with instances of
forbidden purpose; after all, one of the elements of the O 'Brien test requires a
determination of whether the government's action is unrelated to the suppression
of speech. 66 Yet, when the Court applies this prong of the test, it does not probe
governmental purpose. Rather, it reasons from the face of the regulation to divine
plausible purposes that are unrelated to speech.
An example is City of Erie v. Pap's AM.367 Erie forbade public nudity and
applied its ban to sleazy nude dancing establishments such as "Kandyland. ' ,368 The
Court agreed that nude dancing was symbolic expression and applied O'Brien.369
The law was content-neutral and ostensibly had as its purpose "combating crime
and other negative secondary effects caused by the presence of adult entertainment
establishments [rather than] suppressing the erotic message... of nude dancing., 37
Despite evidence that the city council's real aim was to suppress precisely this
message, 7 ' the Court brushed this aside with the observation, derived from
O'Brien, that "this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on
the basis of an alleged illicit motive., 372 Nor will the Court give a litigant the
opportunity to prove the presence of an illicit motive in order to invoke strict
scrutiny. 7 ' While it is too cynical to equate the Court's refusal with W.C. Fields's
immortal quip,3" it is astonishing that the Court remains blind to the application of
its disparate impact doctrine to content-neutral regulations of symbolic speech.
The Court cannot seriously contend that permitting litigants to introduce
evidence of the government's purpose to suppress speech will lead to invalidation
of laws that only incidentally and accidentally impinge upon expression. Just as not
every instance of disparate racial or sexual impact is the product of a forbidden
purpose, 375 not every content-neutral regulation of symbolic speech is the product
of a purpose to suppress expression."' Disparate impact doctrine in equal protection
365. Id. at 382 86.
366. Id. at 376-77.
367. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
368. Id. at 282 83.
369. Id. at 289 302.
370. Id. at 291.
371. See id. at 292.
372. Id. at 292 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 48 (1986);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 83 (1968)).
373. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382-86.
374. NEVER GIVE A SUCKER AN EVEN BREAK (Universal Pictures 1941).
375. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 76 (2003) (noting that educational
institutions are not barred from considering race in the admissions process); Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978) (plurality opinion) (lauding Harvard College's admission process
which uses race as a one plus factor in establishing a diverse student population).
376. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) ("This and other public
indecency statutes were designed to protect morals and public order."), overruled on other grounds by
White River Amusement Pub, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 481 F.3d 163, 171 (2007) (rejecting the
evidentiary standard for establishing a legitimate governmental purpose established in Barnes and
adopting the evidentiary standard established in Renton); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 84
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cases permits the government to escape strict scrutiny, even if a forbidden purpose
has been established as a motivating factor for government action, if the
government can prove that it nonetheless could have taken the action to accomplish
a legitimate objective.3" This is hardly the same as striking down "otherwise
constitutional" laws because of an illicit purpose.
D. Facial Challenges
Reliance on effects may frustrate challenges of the facial validity of
unconstitutional statutes and hinder prevention of the enforcement of these statutes
before they inflict constitutional injury. Because the general rule is that a facial
challenger "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid,, 378 a requirement that purpose inquiry be limited to the face of the
statute, the stated purposes, or inferred only from the effects, would sharply
circumscribe facial challenges. Only the most ineptly drafted measures would be
likely to succumb to facial challenges. The practical problem with facial challenges
is to identify and invalidate those laws that are nearly certain to deliver
unconstitutional effects without waiting to observe those effects and the
concomitant injuries. Thus, facial challenges implicate several of the exceptions
discussed previously.
First, courts are incapable of assessing effects in facial challenges cases
because there are no effects to be observed. Further, predictions of effects, however
accurate, are not the same as real events, as any stock market investor will vouch.
As such, there is room for courts to treat facial challenges as a form of
constitutional prophylaxis. 3 79 Professor David Gans has argued that this preventive
function is desirable in three broad areas: (1) when a chilling effect on
constitutional rights would exist without entertaining a facial challenge; 80 (2) when
statutes confer excessive discretion on officials-with the attendant risk of invalid
exercises of discretion escaping as-applied detection; 381 and (3) when statutes inflict
stigmatic injury. 382 The absence of effects necessarily triggers a search for purpose
that goes beyond inferences from effects.
(1988) (finding that the purpose of an antipicketing ordinance was to protect residential privacy).
377. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) ("Although such
biases may often accompany irrational (and therefore unconstitutional) discrimination, their presence
alone does not a constitutional violation make."); U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35
(1973) (noting that "a bare ... desire to harm ... cannot constitute a legitimate government interest,"
but that the inquiry does not end there; the Court will look to other proffered purposes to determine if
a legitimate government interest exists).
378. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1992) (excluding the testimony of a grand jury witness as
hearsay and remanding).
379. See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2005).
380. Id. at 1352-53.
381. Id. at 1364.
382. Id. at 1379.
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Second, statutes that on their face inflict stigmatic injury produce effects by
virtue of the stigma announced. 83 The courts need not wait for more effects to be
produced. But because stigmatic injury can also be inflicted by effects, 84 facial
challenges that claim stigmatic injury will result from future effects are also cases
where purpose must be considered because consideration of future effects is
inadequate for decision.
In general, facial challenges should represent another exception to the principle
that purpose is to be inferred from text, effects, or stated purposes. It is unrealistic
to rely on conjectural effects as the basis for inferred purpose. Moreover, such a
method piles surmise upon surmise and thus risks the same problem of inaccuracy
that plagues the use of motive evidence to identify actual purpose. Therefore, facial
challenges necessarily require detection of governmental purpose by reference to
the statute, the stated purposes, the connection-or lack thereof-between means
and purpose so detected, and only as a last resort careful consideration of
motive evidence in conjunction with other probative circumstantial evidence.
E. Some Implications for Constitutional Doctrine
The conclusion that effects should primarily drive constitutional adjudication
implies that a number of constitutional doctrines ought to be reexamined. Bear in
mind that purpose cannot, and should not, be exiled entirely from constitutional
adjudication. For the reasons advanced earlier, the most objectionable form of
purpose inquiry is judicial inference of actual legislative purpose from motive
evidence. 85 In questioning the doctrines that follow, the objective is not so much
to drive out purpose inquiry altogether as it is to cabin such inquiry into a more
reliable form.
The Court's focus on purpose to separate content-based and content-neutral
speech restrictions is misguided. This has led to such anomalous results as the
secondary effects doctrine, in which the attribution to the government of a purpose
unrelated to speech suppression is sufficient to transmute facially content-based
speech regulations into content-neutral ones. 86 If such regulations, which typically
pertain to land use in order to address the sordid side effects of the commercial
trade in sexually explicit expression, are truly aimed at the secondary effects of
383. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,575 (2003) ("When homosexual conduct is made
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres."); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (observing that the statutory ban on African Americans serving as jurors was
"practically a brand upon them, affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority"), abrogated on other
grounds by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 536 37 (1975) (rejecting the dictum in Strauder that a
state may constitutionally confine jury service to men).
384. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) ("There can be no doubt that [a
stigmatizing injury caused by racial discrimination] is one of the most serious consequences of
discriminatory government action."); Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (noting the
significant psychological impact on black children that resulted from school segregation).
385. See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 366 71 and accompanying text.
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such speech, they should easily be able to survive strict scrutiny. Crime control and
prevention are surely compelling interests. If content-based regulations of the
location of such speakers are necessary to combat the crime associated with, but not
produced by, such speech, strict scrutiny is satisfied. As an alternative method, the
Court could avoid purpose inquiry by treating the entire category of sexually
explicit, but nonobscene speech, as a "low value" category that is entitled to
reduced protection under an intermediate level of scrutiny. There are considerable
objections to this latter approach, which are beyond the scope of this Article. The
benefit, which might not be enough to overcome the objections, is that it would take
the Court out of the business of divining the government's purpose for regulating
sexually explicit speech.
The Court should reexamine its focus on purpose to decide whether the
government has created a limited public forum. A functional test, which would be
largely effects-based, should control determination of this question. At one time,
it appeared that the Court had taken this step when it declared that the "crucial
question" in assessing restrictions on speech in alleged public fora was "whether
the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time." '387 Were the Court to return to this test, it
would be required to assess the effects of speech on government property, rather
than the sometimes murky intentions of the government, to determine the limits of
the speaker's right to speak in such publicly owned locales. Although the test from
Grayned v. City of Rockford is subjective it eschews bright lines, pigeon holes,
and tiered scrutiny dependent on the pigeon hole in which the public property is
placed388-it does obviate the need for the equally uncertain inquiry into
governmental purpose. As with other areas, if consideration of effects is insufficient
to deliver an answer, further inquiry into purpose would be in order.
More broadly, the Court should reconsider its reliance on purpose as the
method to sift content-based from content-neutral speech regulations. An example
is Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,389 which considered a federal law
requiring cable operators to carry local broadcasts free of charge.39 ° Congress's
stated purpose was to promote a diversity of viewpoints in the media, 9 ' and the
Court splintered over whether purpose operated to make the law content-
based-and thus trigger strict scrutiny.392 The Court treated the law as content-
neutral despite Congress's declaration of a content-based purpose, because the
effect of the law was to require cable operators to carry additional programming
387. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). This comment led Geoffrey Stone
to enthusiastically declare that, with it, "the right to a public forum came of age." Geoffrey R. Stone,
Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 251 (1975).
388. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 21.
389. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
390. Id. at 626.
391. See id. at 662.
392. Compare id. at 661 62 (agreeing with the district court that the law was content-neutral and
should be evaluated under the intermediate level of scrutiny), with id. at 678-82 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that the law was content-based and should face
strict scrutiny).
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without regard to its content.393 This approach makes sense; if the law did not
deliver content-based effects, why treat it as content-based simply because
Congress has confessed to that objective? The secondary effects doctrine is the
mirror image of Turner Broadcasting, but the Court has it wrong there. If content-
based land use regulations deliver content-based effects, the Court should subject
the regulations to strict scrutiny despite the government's purpose to address social
ills that are not the immediate product of expression.
The Court should question its focus on secular purpose under the Lemon test.
As discussed earlier, when a government openly avows a purpose that is either
religious or hostile to religion, it inflicts inherent or stigmatic injury, and its action
is void on that ground alone. 94 However, there is no reason to place the legislature
on the judicial psychiatrist's couch to imagine legislative purpose. The Lemon test
is creaky enough without adding to its burden the ineffable task of inferring actual
governmental purpose from the flimsy raw materials of motive. The Louisiana
legislature may have had a religious purpose in enacting the law at issue in
Edwards v. Aguillard,3 9' and because the challenge to it was facial, purpose inquiry
was appropriate. Yet, if neither the face of the law, its stated purpose, nor its
inferred future effects revealed such a purpose, perhaps the law should have been
allowed to take effect. If the law had taken effect, we would have soon seen
whether creation science was Genesis in a lab coat as Justice Scalia discussed. 96
That revelation would not only have killed the law, but it might also have killed
creation science as a topic for public education.
Similarly, the Court should reexamine its nascent focus on government hostility
to religion in Free Exercise cases. The Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah did not need to rely on evidence of Hialeah's purpose in
exempting from its ban on ritual animal slaughter virtually every form of such
killings except those practiced by Santerians. 97 The impermissibly pointed effect
of the statute was sufficient for the result. Likewise, the Court in Locke v. Davey
was wrong to rely on the absence of a governmental purpose of hostility to religion
as the rationale for its decision upholding Washington's ban.398 Perhaps
Washington's stringent ban on state aid for theological instruction could have
survived strict scrutiny, but the Court should have subjected the ban to that
searching level of review.399 The ban was as pointed as that at issue in Lukumi. The
pernicious effect of Locke is that it invites use of a judicial divining rod to
determine the presence or absence of a governmental purpose that is hostile to
religion.
393. See id. at 653 62 (majority opinion).
394. See supra note 287.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 228-33.
396. See supra text accompanying note 234.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 274 78.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 37 39.
399. See id. Washington might have successfully argued that it had a compelling interest in
enforcing, via its state constitution, a more stringent ban on religious establishments than would be
possible under the analogous federal provision.
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The Court should also reconsider its propensity to infer illegitimate
governmental purpose when it employs minimal scrutiny. Rather than infer illicit
purposes in such cases as City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center4 °° and Romer
v. Evans,4"' the Court should confine its inquiry to the rationality of the chosen
means to accomplish the stated or hypothesized end. Given the ludicrous
underinclusion in Cleburne, and the simultaneous overinclusion and underinclusion
combined with the pariah effects produced by Colorado's Second Amendment in
Romer, these cases would have reached the same result without second guessing the
government's purpose. That may not be true of United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, but as pointed out by Justice Brennan in his opinion for the
majority, the food stamp exclusion at issue served the stated purposes remarkably
badly.40 2 So badly, in fact, that it would not be much of a stretch to conclude that
these means were not a rational way of achieving the stated end. In any case, it
might be useful to ponder whether a case like Moreno or, better yet, Romer, might
fall into the category of a disparate impact case. If the effects produced are
sufficiently suspicious, the challenger ought to be permitted an opportunity to
invoke a higher level of scrutiny upon proof of a forbidden purpose as a motivating
factor for the government's action.
Finally, the Court should question its current formulation of the undue burden
test for previability abortion regulations. This is not the place to debate the
propriety or coherence of the undue burden test, or to debate the modern project of
substantive due process. Rather, whatever the merits of undue burden as a
constitutional test, it is questionable whether a governmental purpose to erect a
substantial obstacle to a previability abortion is of any consequence if the chosen
means fail to create a substantial obstacle. Perhaps the question of whether any
given abortion regulation has the effect of erecting a substantial obstacle to an
abortion is too amorphous for judicial resolution, but if that is so, the entire undue
burden test ought to be scrapped. However measurable, it is the effect of
governmental action that matters here.
There may be other doctrinal areas that are deserving of reconsideration. This
brief summary identifies some of the prominent candidates. In doing so, I hope to
spark discussion of the merits of my proposal, not to write the last word on the
subject.
400. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 50 (1985) (refusing to
uphold an ordinance that required a special permit for a home for the mentally retarded when the home
did not threaten the city's legitimate interests in any way different than other multiperson homes).
401. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that an amendment of the Colorado
constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause because, notwithstanding the stated purpose of
protecting homosexuals, the amendment operated to prevent local governments from providing
homosexuals with more protection from discrimination).
402. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
[Vol. 59: 1
2007] CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSE 59
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial consideration of governmental purposes is a necessary part of
constitutional adjudication, but courts have not formulated any guiding principles
for the exercise of that task. There is neither agreement on the method by which
governmental purpose is to be determined nor is there any agreement on when
purpose is relevant to constitutional decisionmaking. This fractured and ill-
considered situation is not necessary.
In general, courts should first rely upon the effects of government action to
decide constitutional issues, for that is what harms or helps those subject to
governmental actions. Because tiered scrutiny requires consideration of
governmental purpose, courts should develop consistent standards to ascertain
governmental purpose within each tier of scrutiny. When employing minimal
scrutiny, courts should accept plausible hypothesized purposes or the government's
stated purposes. However, when the chosen means are wildly divorced from those
purposes or serve them so poorly that the purposes become implausible, courts
should not hesitate to declare the hypothesized or stated purposes to be irrational,
rather than forage among mere snippets of motive evidence to surmise an inferred
actual purpose. Within any form of heightened scrutiny, courts ought to examine
the face of the statute or its application in practice for circumstantial evidence of a
forbidden purpose. In the absence of such indicators, and when the effects of the
action are constitutionally suspicious, courts should liberally permit challengers of
the action to offer proof of an illegitimate purpose. This is, of course, what
disparate impact strives to do, but that doctrine has been confined to equal
protection cases and has not been applied to the analogous circumstances of
governmental regulation of conduct that restrict symbolic speech. The O 'Brien test,
which governs such cases, is inadequate to the task it is called to perform.
While this prescription may sound like a description of current doctrine, it is
not. Courts deviate significantly from the nominal doctrine, with little indication of
the triggers for such deviation. The most lamentable deviation is the propensity of
courts, frequently when applying minimal scrutiny, to infer an actual illegitimate
purpose from skimpy and inadequate evidence of legislative motive. Such
inferential judgments of governmental purpose cause little harm in cases of
statutory construction because inaccurate determinations of governmental purpose
can be legislatively repaired. On the other hand, mistaken inferential judgments of
governmental purpose in constitutional adjudication cements the error-not only
is the particular case affected, but future cases are affected by legitimizing this
dubious method of ascertaining governmental purpose.
There are four broad categories of exceptions to the aforementioned principle
that effects of governmental action should matter more than governmental
purposes. The first exception involves intangible stigmatic injuries. When the
government's chosen means are not effective to accomplish a forbidden purpose,
courts should generally ignore that purpose. However, when a forbidden purpose,
by itself, inflicts inherent or stigmatic injury, courts should void the action even in
the absence of more tangible injurious effects. The second exception occurs when
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courts are not capable of assessing whether the means chosen to accomplish an
illegitimate purpose are effective. In such cases, there are two reasonable
prophylactic approaches for a court faced with an identified bad purpose: the court
can either strike the action or subject it to heightened scrutiny. The third exception
is an application of disparate impact doctrine to other areas of possible unintended
consequences. The government may act legitimately to address harm, but in doing
so may unintentionally infringe upon constitutional liberties. This can occur in
many more areas than racial or sexual disparate impact. The prime example is
apparently legitimate regulations of conduct that have the effect of restricting
symbolic expression. The final exception is for facial challenges. Because there are
no actual effects that courts can measure, facial challenges necessarily require
identification of purpose from the face of the statute, from the legislature's stated
purpose, or from the strength or weakness of the connection between the means and
the facial or stated purposes. In cases of facial challenges alleging stigmatic injury
from the probable effects of the law, further inquiry into purpose may be necessary
to prevent the infliction of such injuries.
The implication of this view of the relevance of governmental purpose to
constitutional adjudication is that a number of constitutional doctrines ought to be
reconsidered. In the area of free speech, these include the reliance on purpose to
distinguish content-based from content-neutral speech regulation, the secondary
effects doctrine, and the use of purpose to decide whether the government has
created a public forum for speech. With respect to the religion clauses, courts
should consider whether the withered Lemon test should shrink a bit more, by
elimination of the purpose inquiry, and whether courts should abandon purpose
inquiry when applying the Employment Division v. Smith °3 criteria for resolving
free exercise cases. Finally, the disjunctive purpose prong of the undue burden test
for abortion regulations appears to be of little utility and should probably be
abandoned. So long as tiered scrutiny remains the operative principle of
contemporary judicial review, judicial scrutiny of governmental purpose must
remain. That inquiry need not be amorphous, free-floating, and unguided. The
effects of governmental action are the pincers of the governmental pliers. That is
what courts should examine first.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 256-64.
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